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1. Introduction  
 
This report on water in Latin America is presented in three sections. 
 
Firstly, it covers the development in private and public sector institutions. This includes mapping 
which international companies remain in the region and which have left; the activity of private 
companies based in South America itself; the presence of private equity and investment funds; the 
development of new public sector services; and examples of public-public partnerships (PUPs) and 
water operator partnerships (WOPs) 
 
Secondly, it discusses some of the major issues currently affecting water services in the region, 
including the issues of BOT contracts; the activities of the development banks; the refinancing of 
water services using local savings, through both the public and private sectors; continuing disputes 
over privatisation; and the specific problem of continuing court cases by multinational companies 
claiming compensation. 
 
Thirdly, it includes a country by country survey of developments with the services which have been at 
some point subject to private sector involvement. 
 
2. Companies 
2.1. The retreat of the multinationals 
Multinational water companies have retreated from Latin America in the last 5 years. The two key 
reasons have been public opposition, and failure to make large enough profits. In January 2003 Suez, 
the largest operator of private water contracts in Latin America, announced that it would withdraw 
from operations in developing countries unless the return on capital was at least 13%. In 2007, Suez 
announced that its withdrawal was complete, and that it no longer has any employees in water in Latin 
America. 
 
2.1.1. Multinationals which remain in Latin America 2007 
Few multinational companies from outside the region now remain in possession of water operating 
contracts – concessions, leases, or management contracts – in Latin America. Those which do remain 
have no intention of expansion, and have even attempted to sell some of  their remaining holdings.  
 
There are no longer any English of French water companies acting on their own. The remaining short 
list is dominated by two Spanish-French groups, plus two other Spanish companies. This is similar to 
the electricity sector, where all three major Spanish electricity companies continue to operate in the 
region, although most multinationals from the USA and elsewhere, including the French company 
EdF, have retreated from Latin America. 
 
The two Spanish-French water companies are Aguas de Barcelona (AgBar), whose largest 
shareholder is the French company Suez; and  Proactiva, a 50-50 joint venture between the Spanish 
construction and waste group FCC and the French water and waste company Veolia. Even these 
companies have already given up some of their contracts: AgBar, for example, has exited from its 
contracts in Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina; and Veolia/FCC/Proactiva  has lost its Argentinian 
contracts in Tucuman and Catamarca.  Neither of these companies expects to expand, and are likely to 
contract further. Agbar states that it has no intention of adding to its existing contracts, and has 
already sold 49.9% of its major Chilean subsidiary, Aguas Andinas, to local investors through the 
stock exchange. Agbar also agreed the sale of its stake in the Cartagena contract in Colombia in 2005, 
but the sale was vetoed by the municipality. Veolia/Proactiva has also sold 49% of its Mexican 
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subsidiary to a local firm, and wants to sell its holding in the Brazilian company Sanepar, despite its 
legal action to retain its right to a minority shareholding. 
 
There are four more Spanish companies. One is the electricity company Iberdrola, which does not 
regard water as a core sector, has no other water investments anywhere in the world, and has already 
tried to sell its Essal company in Chile; two of the Spanish construction groups, ACS and Sacyr 
Vallehermoso, have isolated contracts; and the municipally owned water company of Madrid, Canal 
Isabel II has a 60% holding in the shares of the private Colombian operator AAA. There are two 
Italian companies with remaining interests: Acea, the semi-privatised water and electricity company 
of Rome, which has already discussed selling its only distribution company, in Honduras, and is 
experiencing problems with its BOT contract in Peru; and the construction groups Edison and 
Bechtel, which own the private operator in Guayaquil, which is under increasing public and political 
pressure. There is also a Japanese group, Marubeni, with a single small company in Chile. Finally, a 
Canadian investment fund, the Ontario Teachers Pension Plan (OTPP), has become a substantial 
investor in water in Chile, covering a population almost as large as AgBar.    
 
The multinational presence is thus reduced to a small core of Agbar, Proactiva, a few other Spanish 
companies, and, in Chile, the investment fund OPTT and Marubeni.   
Table 1 Multinationals remaining in water in Latin America 
Multinational 
Home 
country 
Contracts 
continuing in 
2007 
 
Contracts 
terminate
d or sold 
by 2007 
 
  Country City Country City 
      
Aguas de Barcelona Spain/France Chile Santiago Brazil 
Campo 
Grande 
  Colombia Cartagena Argentina 
Aguas 
Argentinas 
  Cuba Habana Argentina Santa Fe 
  Cuba Varadero Uruguay 
Aguas de la 
Costa 
  Mexico Saltillo   
Proactiva/Veolia/FCC Spain/France Colombia Monteria  Argentina Tucuman 
  Colombia Tunja Argentina Catamarca
1
 
  Colombia San Andres 
Venezuel
a 
Aguas de 
Monagas 
  Mexico Aguascalientes   
  Brazil Sanepar   
ACS/Urbaser Spain Argentina SAMSA (Misiones) Argentina AGBA 
Iberdrola Spain Chile Essal Uruguay Uragua 
Sacyr Vallehermoso/ 
Valoriza/ AGS 
Spain Brazil 
Sanear, Aguas De 
Mandaguahy 
  
Canal Isabel II Spain Colombia AAA   
  Ecuador Amagua   
Acea Italy Honduras San Pedro Sulas   
Edison/Bechtel Italy/USA Ecuador Guyaquil Bolivia 
Cochabam
ba 
Marubeni Japan Chile Aguas Decima   
Ontario Teachers 
Pension Plan (OTPP) 
Canada Chile Essbio, Essel, Esval   
 
 
 
                                                     
1 The contract is being retendered as a lease contract, and Proactiva are reported to be bidding (September 2007) 
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2.1.2. Multinationals which have left Latin America 
Other companies have exited all operating contracts in Latin America. Their contracts have been 
terminated, or their subsidiaries have been sold to local private or public bodies. This list includes the 
largest private water companies in the world, except for Aguas de Barcelona and Veolia(see above). 
The largest, Suez, transferred its last remaining subsidiary in the region, in Chile, to Aguas de 
Barcelona (see above).   
Table 2 Water multinationals no longer present in Latin America 
Multinational  Home country Contracts sold or 
terminated 
 
  Country City 
Suez France Argentina Buenos Aires 
  Argentina Santa Fe 
  Brazil Limeira 
  Bolivia La Paz/El Alto 
  Puerto Rico  
SAUR France Venezuela Hidrolara 
  Argentina Mendoza* 
Thames Water UK Chile Essbio, Essel 
Anglian Water UK Chile Essval 
Aguas de Bilbao Spain Argentina AGBA 
  Uruguay Aguas de la Costa 
Azurix USA Argentina OSBA 
  Argentina Mendoza 
    
Aguas do Portugal Portugal Brazil Prolagos 
*In process of exit. 
 
2.2. National and local private sector 
Privatisation, and the unravelling of the multinationals‟ presence, has resulted in some water operating 
contracts being held by South American companies, as indicated in the table below. Only two of these 
private companies based in the region are active internationally, i.e. outside their home country. One 
is AAA, from Colombia, which has water operating contracts in Ecuador and the Dominican 
Republic; the other is Latin Aguas, which has obtained a contract, as part of a joint venture with a 
Peruvian company, in Tumbes, Peru. The Chilean companies may reduce in number as a result of 
further bids from multinationals.  
 
These local companies may not be able to raise significant amounts of local capital. The Argentinian 
companies have benefited from public finance and waiving of investment targets in Cordoba 
(Roggio), Mendoza (Sielecki) and Rioja (Latinaguas); and 60% of AAA‟s equity comes from a 
Spanish public sector operator, Canal Isabel II. The Chilean private companies may reduce their 
presence, as Japanese groups are reported to be interested in buying Solari‟s Aguas Nuevas. 
 
 
Table 3 South American private companies 
Company Home 
country 
Operations in home country Operat-
ions 
abroad 
 
   Country Company/ 
location 
Latinaguas/ Chamas Group Argentina Corrientes, Salta and la Rioja Peru Tumbes (jv with 
Concisa) 
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South Water/ Sielecki group Argentina Clorinda, Santiago del Estero, 
Mendoza  
  
Grupo Roggio Argentina Cordoba   
Odebrecht Brazil Limeira   
Bertin/Equipav Brazil Campo Grande; Prolagos; Itu   
Solari group Chile Aguas Nuevas   
Luksic group Chile Aguas de Antofagasta   
Hidrosan/Icafal/Vecta Chile Regions III and XI   
AAA  Colombia  Ecuador Samborondon  
Concisa Peru Tumbes (jv with Latinaguas)   
 
2.2.1. Latinaguas 
Latinaguas is part of the Chamas Group in Argentina. It provides 1.59 million residents with potable 
water and 1.11 million with sewerage service in 132 localities through concessions in three provinces: 
Corrientes, Salta and la Rioja.  
 
2.2.2. South water/Sielecki 
Sielecki is a Mendoza based group present in a variety of business in Argentina, from wineries to 
pharmaceuticals and banking, and most recently to the oil industry. It has a key stake in the Mendoza 
water company OSM. South Water also holds the Aguas de Formosa concession in Clorinda, the 
capital of the Formosa province, since December 1995 and the Aguas de Santiago concession in 4 
cities in the province of Santiago del Estero since 1997. 
2.2.3. Grupo Roggio 
Firstly established as a construction company, Grupo Roggio was a major participant in the 
Argentinean privatisations of the 1990s, specifically in the roads, railways and telecommunications 
sectors. Via the minority shareholder Servicios del Centro (16.3%), the Roggio Group had already a 
stake in Aguas Cordobesas as part of the Suez/Agbar-led consortium. However, with the new deal it 
acquired control of the private concessionaire in December 2006.  
 
2.2.4. AAA (Triple A) 
Triple A (AAA) is 60% owned by Canal Isabel II, the muncipally owned water company of Madrid, 
and so should perhaps be regarded as an international municipal company rather than a local private 
company. It provides water supply and sanitation services to Barranquilla and Soledad. Other 
Colombian operations include Santa Marta and Puerto Colombia and, since March 2005, 
Sabanagrande and Santo Tomas1. Triple A has also expanded in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic 
 
2.2.5. Hidrosan 
Hidrosan Ingeniera is a Chilean water and waste management company.  In 2001 it paid CLP 2.1 
billion (Euros €3.1m) to Thames Water's subsidiary Essbio. The Chilean authorities prosecuted 
Thames Water over this, and Thames agreed that the payment was imporper and agreed to pay USD 
$11.1m compensation to  Essbio. Hidrosan is also one of three partenrs owning Chanar, another 
privatised Chilean water company. Chanar awarded a  construction contract to Hidrosan. Hidrosan 
was employed as a consultant when the Santiago water company, Emos, which was privatised to 
Suez, awarded  a construction contracts of $315m. To degremeont, a subsidiary of Suez. Hidrosan 
certified that this award was in order. 
 
2.2.6. Luksic 
The Luksic group holds a water concession in Antofagasta through its majority stake in Antofagasta 
plc, a long-established company listed on the London stock exchange which was originally set up in 
the 19th century to invest in the railway from Antofagasta. Antofagasta plc is now mainly a copper and 
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other mining company, with the water company, which partly serves its mines, as a profitable 
sideline. 
 
 
2.3. Investment funds 
 
In the north, especially in the UK and the USA, there has been a growing number of private 
operations bought by private equity firms. In Chile, a Canadian pension fund, the Ontario Teachers 
Pension Plan (OTPP), has bought up a number of water companies, and is now owns the second 
largest cluster of water companies in the country, serving over 36% of the population. There are no 
other signs of investment funds from the north buying water companies in South America. 
 
No private water companies in South America are wholly or partly owned by private investment funds 
based in Latin America, as at October 2007. There have been a few cases where Latin American 
investment funds  have bought stakes in water companies, or tried to, but as at October 2007 none 
own any holdings of significance. In 2006 Suez discussed the sale of the Buenos Aires private 
company to investment funds Fintech (Argentinian) and Latam Assets (Mexican-American), but the 
sale did not take place because the funds did not receive guarantees of price rises. An Argentinian 
investment fund, Southern Cross, bought the Chilean operations of Thames Water in 2006, but in 
2007 sold these on to OTPP. Chilean investment groups also bought control of Esval from Anglian 
Water in 2003, but agreed to sell Esval to OTPP in 2007.  
 
2.3.1. Ontario Teachers Pension Plan (OTPP) 
The OTPP is the largest pension fund in Canada, covering 271,000 teachers, with US$101 billion in 
net assets. US$15.2 billion of this is invested in private equity, forestry and infrastructure. The  
Infrastructure Group “focuses on the acquisition and long-term retention of low-risk assets that 
generate stable returns linked to inflation.” .2  
 
Its infrastructure investments include 25% of the shares of Northumbrian Water, a UK water 
company; 50% of Intergen, an electricity generating company; 25% of Scotia Gas, a UK gas 
distribution company; and 100% of CGT Terminals, a north American container port terminal 
company. 3 It also invests over US$900m. in the Maquarie Infrastructure fund.4  
 
The OTPP emphasises the long-term nature of its investment in Chile: “We‟re a long-term investor 
and are committed to supporting the development plans of these companies….Infrastructure 
investments generate reliable, long-term returns that are correlated to inflation, making them a good 
match for paying inflation-indexed pensions to the plan‟s members.” 5 
2.4. Public sector 
The public sector has recovered many of the privatised concessions. As shown by the table, this 
process re-emphasises the range of forms and structures adopted by the public sector, with differing 
roles for national, regional and local governments, as well as employees and communities.  
 
The public sector continues to operate in all cities other than those which have retained privatised 
operations.  
Table 4 Renationalisation and remunicipalisation of private water contracts 
Country City/region Public sector entity Owners    
   National State/ 
region/ 
province 
Munici
pal 
Employ
ees/ 
union 
Argentina Buenos Aires AySA 90   10 
 Buenos Aires Aguas Bonaerense  90  10 
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(province) SA (ABSA) 
 Buenos Aires 
(province) 
Aguas Bonaerense 
SA (ABSA) 
 90  10 
 Tucuman Sapem/OST  90  10 
 Santa Fe Aguas Santafesinas 
SA 
 51 39 10 
Bolivia La Paz/El Alto Epsas 100    
 Cochabamba Semapa   100  
Uruguay Maldonado 
(Aguas de la 
Costa) 
OSE 100    
 Maldonado 
(Uragua) 
OSE 100    
Venezuela Hidrolara State of Lara and 
municipal 
governments 
 50 50  
 Aguas de 
Monagas 
State of Monagas 
and municipal 
government 
 49 51  
 
 
In Argentina, the renationalisation of water in Buenos Aires re-establishes a strong role for central 
government in the sector, which was the case before the privatisations of the 1990s were induced. It is 
noteworthy that workers and unions often have a formal ownership stake in the new public entities. 
This is the result of the employee shares which were introduced at the time of privatisation, which 
were originally intended to buy off opposition from workers and unions. 
 
In Brazil, which has a mixture of state and municipal water operators, there is a range of initiatives 
and developments.  The association of municipal operators, Assemae, has been actively encouraging 
the development of municipally owned operators, including the use of public-public partnerships. In 
the other direction, two of the major state-owned companies in Brazil have been part-privatised by the 
sale of shares to investors through the stock exchange.  SABESP, owned by Sao Paulo state, is 49.7% 
owned by investors through the New York and Sao Paulo stock exchanges. Copasa, owned by Minas 
Gerais state (59.8%) and the municipality of Belo Horizonte (9.7%), is also listed on the Sao Paulo 
stock exchange, and 30.24% owned by private investors. Both these companies are also engaged in 
international „partnerships‟: SABESP with the utility Sedepal, in Lima, Peru; and Copasa with the 
Paraguayan state water company Essap.  
 
In Colombia, which has both a multinational and a local private operator, three municipally-owned 
Colombian water operators are trying to expand into other areas: EAAB (Empresa de Acueducto y 
Alcantarillado de Bogota), EPM (Empresas Publicas de Medellin) and Aguas de Manizales. Aguas de 
Manizales agreed to take over the Cartagena concession from AgBar, but this was blocked by Bogota 
city council. It is developing management contracts in two other regions. EPM, together with an 
employees pension fund, has taken on a management contract in Bogota, and is bidding for work in 
Peru.  
 
In Uruguay, a referendum decided to make water privatisation illegal, resulting in the 
renationalisation, under OSE, of the two privatised concessions.  
 
In Venezuela, the state has funded development of water services through community organisations in 
Caracas and peri-urban areas.  
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2.5. PUPs and WOPs 
A number of partnerships have been developed. In all cases, they are seen by the receiving operators 
as alternatives to privatisation, or at least responses to pressures for privatisation. The partnership 
between Huancayo and ABSA was initiated by the trade unions in each country, and includes an 
agreement between the unions as well as between the water companies. 
Table 5 Partnerships: PUPs and WOPs 
Receiving 
operator 
 International 
operator 
  
Country Name Country Name Type 
Peru Huancayo Argentina ABSA Muncipal/union 
Paraguay Essap Brazil Copasa State-private 
Peru Sedepal Brazil SABESP State-private 
2.6. Post-privatisation ownership: country patterns 
There are clear differences between countries in the changes to ownership of the privatised utilities.  
In Bolivia, Uruguay and Venezuela all the privatised operations have returned to the public sector, 
under national or municipal ownership.  In Brazil and Chile, private companies have sold operations 
to new private owners.   Only in Argentina is there a mixed pattern, with some companies returning to 
national or municipal ownership, and some being sold to new private owners.  
 
The short-term nature of the presence of the private companies is emphasised by the fact that very few 
privatisations continue under their original ownership. In Colombia, Chile, and Ecuador some of the 
private concessions continue under their original ownership. However, only in Colombia and Ecuador 
are the majority of contracts still under their original owners. In Chile, most of the original operators 
have left, except for AgBar in Santiago, which has sold nearly half its stake to local investors. In 
Ecuador, the contract in Guayaquil is increasingly controversial. In Brazil, the only original stake 
remaining with an international company is that of Veolia in Sanepar, and the legal status and future 
of that holding are hotly contested; the much smaller local private operations also continue.  
Table 6 Ownership changes to privatised water companies in South America, 2007 
Country No 
privatisation 
Returned to 
municipal or 
state 
ownership 
Sold to local 
private 
owners 
Sold to 
international 
private 
owners 
Continuation 
under 
original 
ownership 
New private 
contracts 
(since 2005) 
Argentina  x x    
Bolivia  x     
Brazil   x  x  
Chile   x x x  
Colombia     x x 
Ecuador     x  
Paraguay x      
Peru      x 
Uruguay  x     
Venezuela  x     
 
3. Issues 
3.1. BOTs and other contracts 
The water multinationals continue to hold contracts for building and operating water or wastewater 
treatment plants, under build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts. These contracts are attractive to the 
companies as they provide a guaranteed cashflow for a 30-year period, under a contract with a single 
customer, the water distribution company.  
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However, there have been a number of problems with BOTs in Latin America, including the 
termination of Suez/Degremont‟s BOT wastewater treatment plant in Salitre, Colombia, where the 
authorities estimated that the company had been charging ten times too much, and the termination of 
Biwater‟s BOT contract in Chile in 2006.  This reflects a global pattern with BOT contracts, with 
observed problems including reported corruption in the creation of the contracts; making water 
distributors pay more for treated water than they are charging consumers; and creating unsustainable 
financial obligations on water distribution authorities (Hall and Lobina 2006). 
 
In addition, one of the remaining contracts, AgBar‟s operation in Cartagena, benefits from an 
arrangement whereby the operating company itself, Acuacar, which is jointly owned by Agbar and the 
municipality, subcontracts the management of the operation to Agbar itself for a substantial and fixed 
fee, thus guaranteeing a return regardless of performance.  
 
3.2. IFIs and public finance supporting privatisation: subsidies and campaigns 
Public finance plays an important role in the viability of many private contracts, even where the 
private operators remain.  In particular, it continues to play an important role in investment. 
- In AgBar‟s contract in Cartagena, Colombia, the investments have been overwhelmingly 
financed by the government and a World Bank loan. 
- In Veolia‟s concession in Monterria, Colombia, the government invested over $4.5million by 
2003 
- Grupo Roggio‟s contract in Cordoba is supported by the wiving of concession fees and an 
annual subsidy, together worth US$6.5m. per year. 
- The privatised Tumbes concession in Peru has received guarantees from the government, 
backed by large subsidies from the German government through KfW: a donation of $15m., 
and a loan of $15m. that was conditional on a private operator being introduced. 
 
Public finance, in the shape of the international financial institutions, is also playing a leading role in 
the continued promotion of privatisation in the water sector. Paraguay has responded to IMF pressures 
to propose some form of privatisation of its water utility, and introduced a WOP with a part-privatised 
Brazilian state company. The IADB approved a US$ 50 million loan to Peru in 2005 to promote 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) in water supply and sanitation; the German development bank 
KFW contributes US$22.3million; the Peruvian government US$ 18 million.  
 
Privatisation is also being promoted in Peru by the Cato Institute, a USA right-wing think-tank. An 
unusual example of a pro-privatisation campaign, Peruanos sin Aguas, is operating in Peru, and the 
Cato Institute has issued a press release supporting it, including highly misleading claims, such as:  
“Lima's marginalized poor are correct about the potential of the private sector to meet their water 
needs ……The poor know, too, that the price they're used to paying would fall dramatically with 
privatization.” 6 
3.3. Refinancing investments with local funds: negative FDI 
The general consequence of the withdrawal of multinational companies is that their investments, 
which counted as foreign direct investment (FDI), are refinanced by using local savings. This is true 
whether it is done by sale of shares – as for example the sale of 49.9% of Aguas Andinas in Chile, 
which allowed Suez and Agabar to withdraw US€458m. -  the issuing of local debt to replace 
international loans, or nationalisation/municipalisation.  The pursuit of compensation claims, for 
example the $105m awarded to Vivendi in relation to Tucuman, increases this disinvestment.  
 
There has clearly been a major outflow of foreign investment through the private sector. The impact 
of this can be seen in Argentina, for example, where total  French net disinvestment was over €289 m. 
in 2005, and a similar amount in 2006, as a result of the withdrawal of Suez from the national water 
market and the sale of privatised electricity companies. 7 
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3.4. Current campaigns: Peru, , other contracts 
Campaigns against water privatisation continue in a number of cities even where the privatisation has 
not been terminated or has reverted to another private company, for example Guyaquil (Ecuador) and 
Cordoba (Argentina).   
 
The country with the strongest anti-privatisation campaign is Peru, which is under pressure from the 
IADB and the German government to privatise water. The campaign has succeeded in preventing the 
privatisation of the water utility in Lima, Sedepal, and the privatisation proposed at Huancayo. Instead 
a WOP/PUP has been developed between Huancayo and the Argentinian ABSA (“5 de setiembre”-
operated), alongside an agreement between the peruvian and Argentinian unions. 
 
In Quito, Ecuador a recent campaign was successful in preventing privatisation. There are also 
campaigns against privatisation proposals in central American countries, including El Salvador, where 
16 protestors have been charged with terrorism and one trade unionist was killed in July 2007, shortly 
after participating in a demonstration over water privatisation) and in Nicaragua.8  
3.5. Continuing negotiations and court cases for compensation 
The exit of the multinationals continues to create significant costs for Latin American countries. The 
companies filed many cases at the World Bank‟s arbitration tribunal, ICSID, claiming compensation 
for the contracts which had been discontinued. These cases are proving extremely costly, both in 
terms of the awards, and in terms of the resources consumed in challenging them. NGOs have tried, 
with only partial success, to join the proceedings as amicus curiae.  In May 2007 Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, and Cuba decided to leave ICSID9. 
 
It should be noted that it is Vivendi Universal, the media company and former owner of Veolia, which 
is pursuing the cases and benefiting from the proceeds.  
Table 7 ICSID Cases as of September 2007 - 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm  
Country Concession Claimants Claim  Award Status 
 
Argentina Tucuman Aguas del 
Aconquija, 
Vivendi Universal 
US$ 375m US $105m. Filed: 19.02.97 
Award Rendered 20.08.07: 
US$ 105 million payment 
Argentina Province of  
Buenos Aires 
Azurix US$ 400m US $165m., 
pending 
appeal 
Filed: 23.10.01 
Award rendered (subject to 
appeal): US$ 165m payment 
Argentina Mendoza SAUR 
International 
US$200m-
300m 
pending Filed: 27.01.04 
Saur to discontinue 
proceedings? April 2007 
Argentina Mendoza Azurix ¿? pending Filed: 08.12.03 
Pending (Tribunal not yet 
constituted) 
Argentina Province of  
Santa Fe 
Aguas Provinciales 
de Santa Fe, Suez, 
Aguas de 
Barcelona, 
Interaguas 
Servicios 
US$ 300m pending Filed: 17.07.03 
Pending 
Argentina Cordoba Aguas Cordobesas, 
Suez, Aguas de 
Barcelona 
US$ 108m Settled  Filed: 17.07.03 
“Settlement agreed by the 
parties and proceeding 
discontinued at their request”, 
January 2007  
Argentina Buenos Aires Aguas Argentinas, 
Suez, Aguas de 
Barcelona, 
Vivendi Universal 
US$ 1.7 
billion 
pending Filed: 17.07.03 
Pending (amicus curiae 
allowed) 
Argentina Province of  Impregilo US$ 100 pending Filed: 25.07.06 
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Buenos Aires million Pending (Tribunal not yet 
constituted) 
Bolivia Cochabamba Aguas del Tunari US$ 50m 2 pesos Filed: 25.02.02 Abandoned 
(formally settled), January 
2006 
Bolivia La Paz/El Alto Aguas de Illimani - withdrawn Not filed as mutual agreement 
reached by the parties March 
2006 
 
 
 
4. Developments by country 
 
4.1. Argentina 
Argentina is one of the Latin American states to have privatised water supply and sanitation 
operations to a greater extent and since an earlier date. At the end of 1999, 22 private operators were 
active providing services to 71% of the country‟s urban population (Ducci, 2007: 64-65). The 
remaining part of the population was supplied by state-owned companies and cooperatives, with 
public operations increasing in importance after the termination of a number of concessions following 
the 2001 Argentine crisis. There has also been a major role of Argentine investors and operators in 
those concessions that have not been renationalised.   
   
4.1.1. Aguas Argentinas 
Performance and renegotiation 
The Aguas Argentinas water supply and sanitation concession in Buenos Aires, Argentina, covering 
10 million people, started in May 1993. In September 2005 its private shareholders decided to 
terminate the 30-year contract, due to failure to reach an agreement with the government on the 
revision of tariffs following the Argentine financial crisis of December 2001. The Aguas Argentinas 
concession, which has been promoted as a flagship privatisation, was marred with problems including 
downward revision of the committed investment, failure to deliver on the investment programme and 
upward renegotiation of tariffs, long before the economic crisis which caused the massive devaluation 
of the local currency (Hall & Lobina, 2006: 34-37). 
 
It is clear that the Suez concession in Buenos Aires was already experiencing significant difficulties 
before the devaluation of the peso in 2002. Notably, Aguas Argentinas was already missing even its 
reduced investment commitments whilst at the same time water rates were increasing at a rate 
significantly faster than other prices (Hall & Lobina, 2006: 34-37). According to water regulator 
ETOSS, the total investment realised by Aguas Argentinas from 1993 to 2002 amounted to US$ 1.34 
billion, equivalent to 61% of projected investments (Ducci, 2007: 73). 
 
Argentine crisis and international arbitration 
On the December 2001 Argentine economic crisis, the elimination of currency adjustment provisions 
in water tariffs and the ensuing conflict between the Suez group and the Argentine government, see 
Hall & Lobina (2002: 9-11). In July 2003, Aguas Argentinas, Aguas the Barcelona and Vivendi 
Universal (Veolia has no equity stake in Aguas Argentinas following the separation of Vivendi 
between Vivendi Universal and Veolia Environment) filed an international arbitration suit in front of 
the World Bank‟s ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes)10.  
 
Aguas Argentinas and its shareholders claimed US$1.7 billion in losses caused by currency 
devaluation as a result of the government‟s policy to freeze tariffs11. The amount claimed by Suez 
nears the value of the US$1.8 billion, 5-year investment programme for the period 2007-2011 
developed by AYSA, the public water operator that took over operations after the departure of Aguas 
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Argentinas12. As of April 2005, the total value of the 62 compensation claims submitted to ICSID by 
multinationals (MNCs) active in a number of public services including water supply and sanitation 
amounted to at least US$ 18 billion although other estimates put the figure at US$ 80 billion. The 
latter figure represented “an amount similar to the public-sector foreign debt that Argentina defaulted 
on during the late 2001 economic collapse, which was recently restructured in a debt swap”. The 
difference between the two estimates was due to the calculation methods adopted: the more 
conservative estimate reflected the mere sum of the amounts known to be claimed by the MNCs, 
while the more pessimistic one was due to the fact that Argentina‟s National Treasury prosecutors 
also assessed those compensation claims for which no money value had been defined13.           
 
At the time of writing, the arbitration tribunal had not made a final decision14. While the arbitration 
case was still pending, the Argentine government and Buenos Aires water regulator ETOSS had been 
negotiating with Suez for some time over the amount of the investments Aguas Argentinas would 
have to make15. In May 2005, the arbitration tribunal hearing the Aguas Argentinas case made a 
decision on the petition submitted by 5 NGOs: Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia (ACIJ), 
Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), 
Consumidores Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisión de Servicios de Acción Comunitaria and Unión 
de Usuarios y Consumidores. The petitioners had filed a “Petition for Transparency and Participation 
as Amicus Curiae” requesting that: a) they were allowed access to the hearings in the case and that the 
hearings should be open to the public as a matter of transparency; b) they were allowed the 
opportunity to present legal arguments as amicus curiae, on the grounds that the case affected the 
public interest; and c) they were allowed timely, sufficient, and unrestricted access to all of the 
documents in the case. The court decided: a) to deny access to the hearings because “The crucial 
element of consent by both parties to the dispute is absent in this case”; b) to allow third parties to 
submit briefs to the court, under specific conditions, as amicus curiae or “friends to the court”, 
because the tribunal recognised that the briefs were justified by the public interest which was affected 
by the case and could serve to broaden the elements of evaluation in the adoption of the final decision; 
and c) to decide on the request to access the documentation on the case only if and when the tribunal 
would decide to grant a third party permission to file a brief as “friend to the court”16. In February 
2007, the Tribunal decided to allow the petitioners to submit an amicus curiae brief. However, the 5 
NGOs were not granted permission to attend the proceedings and were denied access to arbitration 
documents17. 
 
In April 2007, the petitioners made an amicus curiae submission to the tribunal. “The brief 
emphasizes that human rights law recognizes the right to water and its close linkages with several 
other human rights, including the right to life, health, housing, and an adequate standard of living. The 
brief further notes that human rights law requires that Argentina adopt measures to ensure access to 
water to the population, including physical and economic access. Under this light, the freezing of the 
tariff levels amidst an economic crisis allowed the population to have access to water and sanitation, 
and thus the measures complied with Argentina's requirements under human rights law. 
 
The amicus curiae brief notes that human rights law requires Argentina to ensure access to water and 
sanitation to the population, and that the rationale underlying the freezing of tariff levels amidst an 
economic and social crisis is relevant for the interpretation and application of the standards of 
treatment in the relevant BITs”18 (Bilateral Investment Treaties).     
 
Termination and the aftermath of Aguas Argentinas’ exit 
 In February 2006, Suez declared it was withdrawing its ICSID claim in order to facilitate the sale of 
its shares in Aguas Argentinas to any buyer, as the deal had been complicated by the government‟s 
refusal to allow the concessionaire increase water tariffs. In January 2006, Suez was holding talks 
aimed at selling its shares to a consortium made by investment funds Fintech and Latam Assets, one 
Argentine, the other Mexican-American, while Aguas de Barcelona would have acted as operator of 
the service. Even if the potential buyers offered to compensate Suez for renouncing its ICSID claim, 
the negotiations with the consortium failed as the Argentine government rejected the investment 
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funds‟ request for tariff hikes. Negotiations also failed with Argentine businessman Eduardo 
Eurnekian as he was not prepared to pay the US$ 350 million requested by the Suez group as 
compensation for renouncing the ICSID claim “as they consider the suit to be an asset worth that 
particular sum”. So that in late February 2006 Suez intended to put pressure on the government to 
cancel the Buenos Aires concession and press on with the arbitration proceedings. According to Suez, 
the Argentinean government could buy Aguas Argentinas in case no private investors decided to do 
so. Another option apparently contemplated by the government and trade union Fentos/CGT, which 
owned a 10% equity stake in Aguas Argentinas, was that the concessionaire would be temporarily 
renationalised and while the government was looking for an operator or was re-offering a concession 
to bidders, the workers would take charge of operations. Fentos/CGT general secretary José Luis 
Lingeri declared that, in the absence of interest from the private sector, the state could take charge of 
the service and the trade union would collaborate by guaranteeing adequate operation and 
maintenance. Mr. Lingeri confirmed that the union would retain ownership of 10% of Aguas 
Argentinas‟ capital but stressed that if the government ruled out any tariff increase then it would have 
to contribute with public financing and subsidies. In fact, operation and maintenance required a yearly 
sum of Peso 150 million and the expansion of service coverage required between Peso 200 million 
and Peso 250 million, while yearly turnover of Aguas Argentinas was around Peso 750 million19.         
 
In March 2006, the Argentine government revoked Aguas Argentinas‟ concession on grounds of 
failure to provide the promised levels of investment and service quality. Minister of Planning Juan De 
Vido revealed that “43 of the 151 water sources used by Aguas Argentinas had more than the 
permitted level of nitrates in their water, suggesting that the water has not been filtered properly”. 
Aguas Argentinas justified having cut back on investment because water and sewage charges had 
been frozen since 200220. A survey carried out by consulting firm OPSM for Argentine newspaper 
Página/12 found that 83.4% of the interviewees supported the decision to terminate the concession. 
More precisely, 72.3% of the interviewees said they agreed with the decision to rescind the contract 
and 11.1% very much agreed with the same decision21.   
 
Aguas Argentinas‟ exit was accompanied by lawsuits brought by individual citizens, civil society 
organisations and local authorities for the poor level of service or failure to provide any service at all, 
ranging from lack of water pressure to erroneous billing, from deterioration of housing resulting from 
rising groundwater to bills charged for services that were not provided. Due to water borne diseases 
spreading even in important urban centres, consumers‟ organisation ADUCC (Asociación de Defensa 
de los Derechos de Usuarios y Consumidores) described the situation as an emergency. The lawsuits 
amounted to an aggregate value of Peso 1.5 billion (US$ 487 million) and ombudsman Eduardo 
Mondino called for the courts to freeze Aguas Argentinas‟ assets to safeguard the interest of citizens 
affected by Aguas Argentinas poor performance22. In September 2006, water regulator ETOSS fined 
Aguas Argentinas for Peso 1.5 million (US$ 485,000) for failures to fulfil the concession contract and 
for neglecting users‟ complaints. This brought the total amount of fines imposed on the private 
operator in 2006 to more than Peso 25 million. Between 2003 and 2005, Aguas Argentinas was fined 
by ETOSS for a total of Peso 30.4 million23. In May 2006, commercial bank and Aguas Argentinas 
minority shareholder Banco de Galicia  was taking legal action against Suez as the main shareholder 
and comptroller of the concessionaire. More precisely, Banco de Galicia  was seeking compensation 
for damages suffered as a result of actions taken or not taken by Aguas Argentinas directors and 
shareholders Suez, Aguas de Barcelona, Anglian Water and Vivendi Universal, that resulted in the 
termination of the concession. They were doing so under Argentine law, which provides for business 
partners‟ “"joint obligation to compensate" their associates if a company is found to have been 
affected or damaged by the controlling partner”. Minority shareholder trade union Fentos/CGT was 
also planning to take similar legal action24. In April 2006, Aguas Argentinas was “trying to collect an 
estimated 60mn-100mn pesos (US$19.5mn-32.5mn) in owed bills”25. In October 2006, a group of 
Aguas Argentinas lenders filed a lawsuit in New York against Suez and Aguas de Barcelona claiming 
payment of US$ 135 million in compensatory damages for principal, interest and other charges owed, 
as well as in punitive damages. The group of lenders, named Aguas Lenders Recovery Group LLC, 
described Aguas Argentinas as a “mere shell” and claimed “that the controlling shareholders lost 
Aguas' most valuable asset, the water concession, through gross undercapitalization and 
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mismanagement, while allegedly extracting 'management fees' and other 'self-dealing transactions' 
from Aguas. 'In the end, Suez/Agbar left not only the citizens of Buenos Aires, but also plaintiff and 
other creditors, literally and figuratively 'high and dry,'' the lawsuit says” 26. Finally, the state-owned 
water operator AYSA that took over from Aguas Argentinas estimated that Peso 2.82 billion 
(US$ 910 million) were needed to solve problems with water pressure and replace pipes and requested 
that the money be collected from the former concessionaire27. 
 
Establishment of public water operator AYSA 
Following the Argentine government‟s decision to rescind the Aguas Argentinas concession in March 
2006, state-owned water operator AYSA (Aguas y Saneamientos Argentinos) was appointed to 
operate water supply and sanitation services. AYSA was 90% owned by the Argentine government 
and 10% owned by the trade union CGT which held the same equity stake in Aguas Argentinas.  
 
The appointment of Carlos Ben as AYSA President was criticised as he had previously been an Aguas 
Argentinas executive as a representative of the Suez Group and was alleged to have been associated 
with the asset stripping of Aguas Argentinas28. CGT adjunct secretary José Luis Lingeri, who had 
already sat in Aguas Argentinas‟ Board of Directors, was confirmed as member of AYSA‟s Board of 
Directors. A governmental spokesman justified the decision in light of the considerable knowledge of 
the system held by workers, without whose efforts the functioning of the system in the last four 
months of Aguas Argentinas operations would have been “impossible”. However, reports also noted 
that Mr. Lingeri, a former supporter of the Menem administration, had also established strong political 
links to the Kirchner administration29. In June 2007, Mr. Lingeri was among others prosecuted for 
mismanagement of a US$ 285 million World Bank loan30.            
 
Despite the above controversies, according to a survey carried out by consulting firm OPSM for 
Argentine newspaper Página/12, 71.6% of the interviewees agreed with the decision to appoint AYSA 
a public water operator. More precisely, 67.3% said they very much agreed with the decision to 
effectively renationalise water operations and 4.3% expressed their mere agreement. 4.3% said they 
were against the appointment of the state-owned operator31. 
 
AYSA identified the removal of nitrates and general improvement in service levels as the immediate 
priorities32. The problems with nitrates were reportedly solved within one year from the beginning of 
operations, although numerous complaints were received, something that AYSA blamed on the state 
of the system left by the private concessionaire33. When the Aguas Argentinas concession was 
terminated in March 2006, the private concessionaire had failed to realise a total Peso 2.819 billion 
(US$ 900 million) in projected investments. From April to December 2006, AySA invested a total of 
Peso 28.3 million, mainly on reducing excessive nitrates levels34.    
 
In October 2006, a long term investment plan was approved providing for the investment of some 
Peso 17.6 billion (US$ 5.69 billion) between 2006 and 2020. The investment plan was aimed at 
achieving full service coverage for water supply (from the current level of 84%) and 90% coverage 
for sanitation (from the current level of 64%) by 2011. Financing would be obtained from AySA‟s 
own resources, that is to say mainly tariffs, while the remaining 48% would come from public sources 
such as the central government (38%), the municipal government of Buenos Aires (5%) and the 
Buenos Aires province and remaining municipal governments within the concession area (5%)35. 
Brazilian state-owned development bank BNDES and the Argentine government were considering 
scope for BNDES to finance part of the Argentinean government‟s contribution to AySA‟s investment 
programme. More precisely, the Brazilian government announced it had US$ 3 billion available to 
invest in infrastructure in Argentina upon the condition that Brazilian firms be involved in the works 
contracted out. BNDES would contribute US$ 600 million to expand Argentine gas pipelines to 
increase the transportation of gas up to nearly 22 million cubic meters each day in the next three 
years. The expansion of the Argentine production of bio-diesel was also discussed by the two 
delegations. Argentine Minister for Planning Julio De Vido emphasised that the proposed BNDES 
finance was not about collaboration between the two governments but a mere business deal in the 
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spirit of Mercosur, as Argentine would in exchange provide Brazil with some 1.2 million daily cubic 
metres of gas36.      
 
AySA operated a social tariff policy in favour of low-income residential users unable to afford paying 
the bill, which by end December 2006 counted over 114,000 beneficiaries and implied a cost of Peso 
4 million per year37. Another policy of its private predecessor retained by AySA was the so-called 
Participative Management Model, whereby “all the parties involved work together: the municipalities, 
the company, the regulatory agency, the neighbors and their representatives. The municipalities are 
responsible for the direction of the work; the company is in charge of developing the projects, training 
the executors, providing the materials and conducting task follow-up; the neighbors actually carry out 
the works; and the regulatory agency provides the necessary legal coverage”. In the year 2006, Km 
25.1 of networks had thus been constructed and 2,254 connections installed benefiting a total of 9,077 
people. As of December 2006 22 works were still in progress which were projected to benefit a total 
of 42,489 people38. The Water + Work Plan (“Agua mas trabajo”) consisted of an initiative introduced 
by the central government to both enhance the expansion of water supply and sanitation service 
coverage and promote employment. The plan was funded by the central government and saw the 
involvement of municipalities were the works were to be implemented, together with labour 
cooperative associations and neighbours, and consisted in the training of unemployed people aimed at 
realising works. This initiative had also begun under the operations of Aguas Argentinas. In 2006, 
AySA had thus facilitated and overseen the implementation of works for the construction of Km 
88.13 of networks and the installation of 8,532 connections, benefiting a total of 56,820 people. As of 
December 2006, 55 works were still in progress under the Water + Work Plan, which were expected 
to benefit 106,245 people39. 
        
As of December 2006, AySA employed 4,058 workers although employment levels were to be 
affected by the decision to terminate outsourcing as used in a number of areas by the former private 
concessionaire Aguas Argentinas40. AySA requested suppliers to comply with labour and social 
regulations in areas such as pay, social security, insurance, safety, hygiene and the environment. 
AySA also privileged national contractors pursuant to national regulations on “Buying National” 
issued in 200241. In August 2006, a “new and ground-breaking” Collective Labour Agreement came 
into force which emphasised training and workers education, with a total of 21,874 training hours 
taking place from March to December 2006. AySA‟s School of Apprentices was also enlarged and an 
agreement was entered into with the Tres de Febrero University “to develop and teach Post-graduate 
studies in Sanitary Engineering”. Initiatives in the area of safety included training and awareness 
raising on the prevention of accidents, vaccination against flu and hepatitis, a regular medical check-
up for the entire workforce, specific technical training and medical check-ups for workers operating 
equipment and driving vehicles, and a campaign against smoke within company premises42.       
 
4.1.2. Province of Santa Fe: problems, Suez withdraws and public company takes over  
In September 1995, a Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux-led consortium was awarded a 30-year concession for 
the provision of water supply and sanitation in the province of Santa Fe, Argentina (2.2. million 
inhabitants, of which Suez serves 1.8 million with water supply and 1.2 million with sewerage)43. The 
concession agreement fixed the limit value of harmful substances to be found in the supplied drinking 
water much above what established by Argentine law. Also, local consumers‟ association Union de 
Usuarios y Consumidores described how the concession had followed a very similar pattern to that of 
other Argentine privatised water concessions, characterised by immediate and persistent 
renegotiation, price increases and downward revision of projected investments and operational targets. 
The first renegotiation of the concession agreement started in May 1997, only 18 months after the 
beginning of operations, and provided for the postponement of projected investments by 6 to 7 years, 
in some cases from 1998 to 2004, in others from 2001 to 2007 and 2008. In December 2000, 
concessionaire Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe (APSF) and the provincial government reached a 
preliminary agreement on the content of a second renegotiation. The proposed renegotiated agreement 
provided for the introduction of additional tariff increases and a substantial reduction in the amount of 
projected investments (see Table 3 below) which, for the period 1996-2008, would total US$ 405m 
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instead of the US$ 707m established by the original concession agreement (Muñoz, 2002). In 2002, 
APSF claimed it had invested US$ 250m in the first 6 years of the concession. As the original 
concession agreement required the concessionaire to invest US$ 356m, APSF failed to realise US$ 
106m or 29.8% of the originally agreed investments (Lobina & Hall, 2003: 11)44. On other problems 
with the Santa Fe concession in terms of quality standards and the charging practices of APSF, see 
Lobina & Hall (2003: 26).   
 
Table 3 APSF (Santa Fe, Argentina), amount of investments provided for in original concession 
agreement and in second renegotiation (proposed renegotiation, not implemented) 
(in millions of pesos/dollars) 
Five-year period Investments provided for in 
original contract 
Investments provided for in  
second renegotiation 
1996 –2000 290.00 245.00 
2001 –2004 211.00 80.00 
2005 –2008 206.00 80.00 
Total 707.00 405.00 
Source: Muñoz (2002). 
 
According to an Inter-American Development Bank report, investments realised by APSF from the 
beginning of operations to end 2003 amounted to US$ 228 million, corresponding to 53% of what had 
been originally established in the contract (Ducci, 2007: 78).  
 
Following the Argentine crisis, the devaluation of the local currency and the governmental policy to 
freeze water tariffs, in July 2003 APSF, Suez, Aguas de Barcelona and Interagua Servicios filed a 
US$ 170 million arbitration suit against the Argentinean government before an ICSID tribunal. The 
compensation claimed subsequently increased to US$ 310 million (Ducci, 2007: 83). The court was 
composed of the same members that were hearing the Aguas Argentinas and Aguas Cordobesas cases. 
At the time of writing the case was still pending45. In March 2006, the ICSID Tribunal rejected the 
request filed by a group of NGOs for an amicus curiae brief on procedural grounds. More precisely, 
although similar in nature to the submission accepted in the Aguas Argentinas case, the petition failed 
to demonstrate that the experience, expertise, and perspectives provided by the petitioners would 
“assist the Tribunal in arriving at its decision”. However, this would not prevent the NGOs to 
resubmit a petition for participation as amicus curiae. Furthermore, local authorities requested the 
University of Rosario to estimate the value of works that the concessionaire was contractually obliged 
but failed to realise, aiming to assess the damage this had caused to consumers and taxpayers. 
 
In June 2005, Suez was in negotiations with Argentine private water operator Latinaguas to sell its 
shares in APSF. When talks failed, Suez tried to sell its shares to the Argentine ceramic and tiles 
group Ceramica Alberdi, while operations should have been guaranteed by the private technical 
operator Passavant, an engineering company with no direct experience in the operation of a water 
supply and sanitation system. This option failed too and in January 2006 Suez decided to withdraw 
from Santa Fe. The provincial government set up the operator Aguas Santafesinas SA (ASSA), 
majority owned by the provincial government (51%) and minority owned by the 15 municipal 
governments within the concession area (39%) and the trade unions (10%), which took over 
operations in early February 2006.   
 
At the time of writing, it remained to be seen what implications the election of Hermes Binner (the 
candidate of the centre-left coalition Frente Progressista) to governor of the Santa Fe province would 
have on the restructuring and operations of ASSA.   
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4.1.3. Aguas Cordobesas: problems, renegotiation and popular opposition  
In April 1997, Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux was awarded a 30-year water supply only concession in 
Cordoba, Argentina (1 million inhabitants) (Ducci, 2007: 83-84)46. Total investment required to 
increase water supply coverage from 83% to 97% in 30 years had been estimated at around US$ 
500m. Although the contract required the operator, Aguas Cordobesas, to invest US$ 150m in the first 
two years, the concessionaire invested only US$ 84m from 1997 to 1999 (Nickson, 2001b: 1, 14-15). 
Accordingly, Aguas Cordobesas failed to realise US$ 66m or 44% of the originally agreed 
investments for the first two years (Lobina and Hall, 2003: 11). 
 
An example of PPP neglecting the need to include shanty towns within the service area is represented 
by Cordoba, Argentina, where the 1997 concession agreement required Suez subsidiary Aguas 
Cordobesas to extend water supply coverage from 83% to 97% over the 30-year duration of 
operations. However, it remained unclear whether the projected 97% coverage ratio included low-
income areas, for which the operator seemed to have no legal requirement to connect residents to the 
network. Also, the 1997 contract only provided for the operator's responsibility to build and extend 
the primary network and not residential connections, which remained the responsibility of the 
municipality or individual households. This was contested by many residents in low-income 
neighbourhoods (Nickson, 2001b: 21-22; Lobina and Hall, 2003: 31-32). Ducci (2007: 88) also notes 
that the difference between the Cordoba concession and the Aguas Argentinas and Santa Fe 
concessions is that investment targets were less strictly defined and “more flexible”.  
 
Following the Argentine crisis, the devaluation of the local currency and the governmental policy to 
freeze water tariffs, in July 2003 Aguas Cordobesas, Suez and Aguas de Barcelona filed a US$ 108 
million arbitration suit against the Argentinean government before an ICSID tribunal. The court was 
composed of the same members that were hearing the Aguas Argentinas and Aguas Provinciales de 
Santa Fe cases. At the time of writing the case appeared to be still pending47. 
 
In late December 2005 the Cordoba congress approved the renegotiation of the concession agreement 
and tariff hikes that would grant the concessionaire a 60% increase in revenues. More precisely, 
Aguas Cordobesas would reportedly “raise charges by 25-50% for medium-income neighborhoods 
and by up to 100% for the wealthiest sectors, but prices will remain substantially smaller for low-
income households”. Cordoba‟s mayor tried to oppose the agreement but failed to stop it: “in light of 
public opposition to the proposed increase in water charges, Córdoba mayor Luis Juez took legal 
action against the agreement, but judge Carlos Lescano ruled that the challenge was inadmissible”. As 
a result of the contractual renegotiation, Suez and Aguas de Barcelona decided they would continue to 
own and operate Aguas Cordobesas and that they would “call off” the arbitration claim before 
ICSID48.  
 
However, in late February 2006 Cordoba‟s provincial government decided to suspend the price hikes 
for three months following public anger and opposition to the deal. Consumers and trade unions 
organised a march against the approved tariff increases, calling for the re-nationalisation of water 
operations and public participation of consumers and trade unions. Anger was motivated by the fact 
that the charges could increase to up to 500% as, apart from increasing tariffs, Aguas Cordobesas 
would “start charging customers for the volume of water they consume rather than the area their 
residence covers”. "We are going to continue protesting until the increase is overturned", vowed 
Oscar Mengarelli of Argentinean workers union CTA (Ducci, 2007: 90)49.  
 
Faced with popular opposition, in March 2006 the provincial government approved a price increase of 
15%, which led Suez and Agbar to withdraw from the concession. Contrary to the cases of 
renationalisation in Buenos Aires and Santa Fe, Cordoba‟s provincial government decided to award a 
concession to a new private operator. In July 2006, the Argentinean private conglomerate Grupo 
Roggio acquired the shares held by Suez and Agbar in Aguas Cordobesas and agreed with the 
provincial government to revise the contractual agreement. Firstly established as a construction 
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company, Grupo Roggio was a major participant in the Argentinean privatisations of the 1990s, 
specifically in the roads, railways and telecommunications sectors. Via the minority shareholder 
Servicios del Centro (16.3%), the Roggio Group had already a stake in Aguas Cordobesas as part of 
the Suez/Agbar-led consortium. However, with the new deal it acquired control of the private 
concessionaire in December 2006 (Ducci, 2007: 89). 
 
The renegotiated agreement with the Roggio group provided for a number of measures aimed at 
guaranteeing the profitability of operations. These included a 12% tariff increase since January 2008, 
the annulment of payment of a US$ 3.3 million yearly concession fee to the provincial government, 
the retention of a subsidy paid each year by the provincial government in favour of the concessionaire, 
which amounted to Peso 9.6 million (US$ 3.2 million) in 2006 and was to increase to Peso 12.6 
million in 2007. Aguas Cordobesas also obtained a US$ 1.7 million loan from local bank Banco de 
Cordoba (Ducci, 2007: 90)50. Importantly, the implementation of the projected investment programme 
was postponed51. Suez and Agbar agreed to provide technical assistance to Aguas Cordobesas until 
December 2007 and retained a 10% equity stake in the concessionaire for three years, in order to 
guarantee the repayment of US$ 28 million to the EIB (European Investment Bank) for a loan issued 
in 1998 (Ducci, 2007: 90)52. Cordoba mayor Luiz Juez denounced in his personal capacity the 
renegotiation of the Aguas Cordobesas concession as illegitimate and flawed due to the alleged 
violation of laws, decrees and administrative regulations53.         
 
In April 2006, Cordoba province governor José Manuel De la Sota guaranteed continuity of 
employment to the workers of Aguas Cordobesas. According to trade union CGT, these totalled 500 
staff including the 150 employees of the company CCLIP, which benefited from services outsourced 
by Aguas Cordobesas. According to Aguas Cordobesas, workers were 42054. 
 
4.1.4. Workers-operated public company takes over OSBA in Greater Buenos Aires after Azurix 
termination  
Awarded in June 1999, Azurix‟ OSBA (Obras Sanitarias Provincia de Buenos Aires) concession 
covering two of the Buenos Aires Province‟s three regions, and its 2 million inhabitants (Ducci, 2007: 
100), ran into trouble following allegations of poor service quality, and failure to honour contractual 
commitments as well as financial problems55.  
 
In October 2001, Azurix (which was then liquidated) announced it would withdraw from the contract 
as of January 2002 accusing the regional government of “serious breaches”56, and would claim 
compensation for a sum of up to US$ 400m57. The concession was terminated in March 2002 (Hall & 
Lobina, 2002: 13-14). For more details on the problems with the concession to Azurix, including poor 
performance and low financial sustainability, see Amorebieta (2005: 149-153). 
 
In October 2001, Azurix filed a compensation claim before ICSID against the Argentinean and the 
provincial government. In July 2006, the ICSID Tribunal issued an award condemning the Argentine 
government to pay compensation of over US$ 165 million plus interest. This represented 29% of the 
amount claimed by Azurix, which had eventually increased to US$ 565 million58. The accuracy of 
Azurix‟ demands for compensation had already been questioned. “Investigations are being done about 
the works that Azurix claim to have done. Fraud is suspected in what they had declared as done but 
does not exist in reality, or was only a simple fitting out of some aqueducts that were supposed to be 
renewed but were not” (Amorebieta, 2005: 156). At the time of writing, the case was still pending as 
the Argentine authorities had appealed against the decision and filed annulment proceedings in 
December 200659. 
 
After the termination of the privatised concession, operations were taken over by a publicly-owned 
company operated by a workers cooperative. “In February 2002, the provincial government either did 
not have the technical staff or the managers needed to take charge of the service. This (under the 
deadline pressure) led the Water and Sanitation Trade Union of the Province of Buenos Aires 
(Sindicato de Obras Sanitarias de la Provincia de Buenos Aires) into urgent negotiations to guarantee 
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the quality, quantity and continuity of the supply to the almost three million people covered by the 
concession”. The provincial government set up Aguas Bonaerense SA (ABSA) as a public sector 
water company, co-owned and operated by workers cooperative “5 de setiembre S.A.”, and with 
strong public participation at many levels. “Users were involved through the representative 
organisations both in the regulator body (ex ORAB) and in the management of the company Aguas 
Bonaerenses S.A. (ABSA), and an agreement was reached to transform the salaries for operating the 
service into new shares for workers once the company had got balanced accounts and got over the 
water and sanitation emergency created by the mismanagement of Azurix Buenos Aires – ENRON”. 
Workers enjoy a superior technical and operational knowledge but this has not prevented them from 
developing “a broad policy of consultations with the authorities, users and consumer unions” 
(Amorebieta, 2005: 153-155).  
 
The immediate results obtained by the workers-operated public company have been positive. “For 
drinking water, more than 100,000 metres of the oldest functioning water networks, some of them 
with over 70 years of use, are being replaced, using modern techniques of piping and contracting 
small and medium domestic companies. Another priority was the building of new water networks in 
the main cities to expand the service to highly populated areas with sanitation problems, and to 
strengthen water pressure and water levels in critical areas on the periphery of some cities. The work 
interrupted by the paralysis of Azurix Buenos Aires has started again, particularly the reactivation of 
the Sewage Treatment Plants and equipping purifying systems that were out of service due to lack of 
investment. This guarantees a reduction in pollution levels. 
 
In 1999 – when privatisation took place - the province of Buenos Aires had a rate of water supply of 
74% and 47% of the urban population had access to sanitation. In 2002, after Azurix withdrew and 
ABSA was established, the supply of water had decreased to 68%, due to demographic growth and 
lack of investments. Sanitation did not reach 43% of the population. Today 71% have potable water 
and 45% have household sewerage. Importantly, up to now all investments were with money from the 
company and of the provincial government budget. Very recently, the governor arranged a loan with 
the World Bank which will be important for the expansion of the services. We have had to urgently 
renovate the water networks as Azurix did nothing at all and leakages amounted to 40% of the 
drinking water produced. Millions of litres have been lost due to the age of the tubes (over 60 years). 
More than 110,000 metres of tubes have been changed and we have recovered the contractual water 
pressure in 30% of the area covered. Similarly, Azurix had practically abandoned half of the black 
waters treatment plants, which resulted in a substantial increase in the pollution of rivers. Now 30% 
more of the paralysed plants have an optimal functioning” (Amorebieta, 2005: 155-156). 
 
Amorebieta (2005: 156-157) identified the main challenges for ABSA as “getting total autonomy by 
incorporating users as shareholders represented by their respective organisations and the inclusion of 
other productive sectors of the region where ABSA provides services. This is needed to guarantee the 
highest possible level of democracy in decision making, the rational use of the economic and financial 
resources, the start of a priority system in the expansion of the service with a social approach and the 
commitment of the state to financing the biggest works that such an important region needs to match 
the demographic growth and the productive development”.  
 
According to Ducci (2007: 105), ABSA had communicated that it was not running an operating 
deficit and that it had complied with its investment programme for the years 2003 and 2004.   
 
4.1.5. Workers-operated public company takes over AGBA in Gran Buenos Aires  
The 30-year concession to operate the sixth sub-region of Buenos Aires province, with some 1.7 
million people, was awarded in November 1999 to AGBA (Aguas del Gran Buenos Aires). The 
successful consortium initially included Aguas de Bilbao, Impregilo and the Argentinean company 
Sideco. The Aguas de Bilbao/Impregilo/Sideco consortium submitted the only bid, for the reportedly 
low amount of US$1.26 million, and won the concession. Urbaser (Dragados group) and Dycasa 
failed to submit tenders despite being pre-qualified, as did Saur, Aguas de Valencia and Suez. But 
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after the concession was awarded in November 1999, Sideco left the consortium "for strategic 
reasons" and Dycasa and Urbaser joined it (Hall & Lobina, 2002: 14) 60.   
 
“In July 2001, AGBA - 20% owned by Aguas de Bilbao; 27.4% owned by Urbaser; and 42.6% owned 
by Impregilo - lagged behind the projected investment plan after 18 months of operations in the Gran 
Buenos Aires region.  As a result, AGBA was holding talks with the local government aiming to 
renegotiate the concession agreement and take into account the "unforeseen events". In May 2002, 
Dragados Urbaser acquired an additional 10% stake in AGBA from Aguas de Bilbao. In April 2002, 
Dragados had declared that it was “not "too concerned" about the economic and financial situation in 
Argentina following the December 2001 crisis, given that its exposure there "is not too significant"”61. 
After various attempts at renegotiating the concession agreement and problems with the affordability 
of the service rendered and disconnections, in January 2006 Aguas de Bilbao was negotiating the sale 
of its minority stake to no better identified pension funds62.  
 
In July 2006, Buenos Aires province governor Felipe Sola announced he had rescinded the contract 
with AGBA claiming that, although the concessionaire had promised to invest Peso 250 million, it 
had failed to invest “a single Peso” in some parts of the concession area63. More precisely, the 
annulment of the concession was first announced by the local government following service problems 
and a dispute on the charges frozen after the Argentine crisis64. When formally announcing the 
rescission of the contract, local authorities “alleged failings in terms of investments and expansion of 
services”65. A study carried out by Argentine university Universidad Nacional de La Plata in 
September 2005 found that of the 1.8 million inhabitants covered by the AGBA concession, 65% 
were not connected to the water supply network and 80% were not connected to sewerage66. 
Following the termination of the AGBA concession, the water supply and sanitation service would be 
operated by the state-owned company ABSA, which already operated in the part of the Buenos Aires 
province previously covered by the Azurix concession and whose technical operator was the workers 
cooperative “5 de septiembre”. ABSA was to employ all the previous AGBA workers and retain their 
working conditions
67
. In August 2006, provincial authorities announced works for the value of Peso 
31 million (US$ 10.1 million) to increase water pressure and enhance potabilisation, ensure the 
subsequent expansion of the water supply network and expand the sewerage network, and to improve 
a number of wastewater treatment plants68. 
 
In July 2007, Impregilo file an arbitration case in front of ICSID claiming over US$ 100 million in 
compensation plus interest and costs. Impregilo claimed that the Argentine government had violated 
the BIT (Bilateral Investment Treaty) between Italy and Argentina by expropriating and renationalisin 
its assets. At the time of writing, the case was still pending and a tribunal to adjudicate the case had 
not been established yet69.  
 
4.1.6. Tucuman water from private to public 
In 1995, a 30-year concession to provide water supply and sanitation services to 87% of the province 
of Tucuman, covering 695,000 consumers, was awarded to Aguas del Aconquija, a consortium led by 
Générale des Eaux (then to be part of the Vivendi group and currently owned by Veolia 
Environnement). Générale des Eaux held 36% of the shares, Dragados 27%, Benito Roggio and Sons 
(27%), with the remaining 10% owned by workers. Aguas del Aconquija was the only bidder despite 
pre-qualified bidders included Saur, Thames Water, Biwater and Madrid‟s municipal operator Canal 
Isabel II. Corruption and irregular conduct has been suspected, in association with allegations of 
irresponsible conduct on both the part of the local authorities and the private concessionaire (Ducci, 
2007: 90-91, 94).  
 
The concession was awarded on the basis of the offered tariff levels and the private operator pledged 
to invest US$ 367 million. As a result, average tariffs including taxes increased by 93.4%. Part of the 
increase was due to VAT (21%), a 6% levy to finance the functioning of regulator ERSACT, and a 
number of municipal and provincial taxes, none of which were charged before the privatisation. Prior 
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
17/05/2010  Page 23 of 60 
   
studies had estimated the need for a mere 33% tariff increase excluding taxes, to allow for the 
implementation of a US$ 300 million investment programme (Ducci, 2007: 91).       
 
Although water tariffs nearly doubled following the award, the company failed to accomplish the 
planned investment programme allowing the water supplied to turn brown70. Consumers stopped 
paying bills and the concession was terminated in October 199871. Before then, in June 2006, the 
Argentine companies holding shares in the concessionaire sold out in order to avoid prejudicing their 
other businesses with the government as a result of the local dispute. Aguas del Aconquija was thus 
85% owned by Générale des Eaux, 5% by Dragados-Construcciones Argentinas and the remaining 
10% by workers (Ducci, 2007: 94).   
 
In February 1997, Aguas del Aconquija and Vivendi filed a US$ 300 million compensation suit with 
ICSID, which initially decided to dismiss the claims. The French MNC appealed against the 
decision72 and after resubmission of the case the Tribunal rendered an award in August 200773. This 
condemned the Argentine government to pay US$ 105 million in compensation plus interest and 
costs74, although the claimant demand had in the meantime increased to US$ 375 million (Ducci, 
2007: 94). Payment would be made to Vivendi Universal, not Veolia Environment, as after Vivendi 
was split between Vivendi Universal and Veolia, the former retained ownership of the shares in the 
Tucuman and Aguas Argentinas concessions75.  
 
In December 2001, Argentine waterworks promotion and financing agency ENHOSA (Ente Nacional 
de Obras Hidricas de Saneamiento) which had provisionally carried out operations after the 
termination of the private concession announced it would set up Sapem - 90% owned by the province 
of Tucuman and 10% owned by the workers union of OST (Obras Sanitarias de Tucuman) – to 
manage and operate water services for 30 years. Tucuman authorities would have to assume the US$ 
6.5 million debt of the public water operator OST. ENHOSA then continued to carry out service 
provision throughout 2002 and 2003 due to the difficulties encountered by Sapam in appointing a sub-
concessionaire. At the end of 2003, the Argentine government pledged to provide Peso 28 million 
(US$ 9.4 million) to finance priority works, mainly to be implemented in 200476.  
 
According to Ducci (2007: 94-95) performance indicators on service coverage had remained at the 
same levels as of 1998. Also, stagnating performance could be explained with the limited financial 
resources available, as tariffs had not been increased since 1996 despite accumulated inflation nearing 
80%. In February 2003, public operator OST started disconnecting users who had failed to pay their 
bills. OST was to cut the service to 17,000 of the 56,000 consumers in San Miguel de Tucuman that 
had not paid their bills since 1998. OST communicated that “only 62,000 users out of a total of 
213,000 pay their bills on time, which explains the utility's 60mn peso (some US$18.9mn) debt”77.   
 
4.1.7. Mendoza: Azurix quits and Saur considers exit 
In May 1998, the provincial government of Mendoza sold 70% of the shares of water operator Obras 
Sanitarias de Mendoza (OSM) to a consortium including Enron Argentina (then Azurix Mendoza), 
Saur International and Italgas. OSM was providing water supply and sanitation services to 900,000 
people, that is to say 80% of the provincial population, and would operate under a 95-year concession. 
Saur was the technical operator and owned 32.08% of OSM, as did Azurix. Other private shareholders 
included Italgas and local company Vila and Groissman. The winning consortium had offered US$ 
132.7 million for the shares, against much lower competing offers of US$ 65.5 million and US$ 53.9 
million. The local government were to benefit for the high price paid for the shares, but also as 
shareholders and for the payment of a yearly royalty for the use of infrastructure. This was set at 
3.85% of net operating revenues collected in the first five years of the concession and was to 
subsequently increase to 9.98% (Ducci, 2007: 96-97)78. 
 
The concession had encountered problems even before the December 2001 Argentine crisis as the 
operator had failed to realise US$ 40 million of the projected investment programme. By end 2002, 
problems included US$ 4.4 million in arrears on payment of the yearly royalty and a total US% 3.5 
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million in penalties imposed by the regulator due to poor service levels. In April 2002, OSM 
requested a 34% tariff increase and a revised investment programme to ensure the economic viability 
of the operations, which local authorities failed to accept. As a result, Azurix filed a compensation 
claim to ICSID in September 2003 and Saur submitted a separate ICSID compensation suit for US$ 
200 million to US$ 300 million in November 2003 (Ducci, 2007: 98)79. At the time of writing, the 
Azurix case was still pending and a tribunal had not been established yet, while in April 2007 the Saur 
case was suspended upon request by the parties80.  
 
Following the liquidation of Azurix, the shares held in OSM by the US-based MNC were sold in 
January 2004 to South Water, owned by Argentine private conglomerate Sielecki, for US$ 1.5 
million. This was a much lower amount than the US$ 65 million originally paid by Azurix. OSM was 
thus owned by South Water (32%), Saur International (32%), the provincial government (20%), 
workers (10%), Italgas (4.5%) and Inversora de Mendoza (1.5%). Mendoza-based Sielecki group held 
equity stakes in the wholly Argentine owned concessions of Formosa and Santiago del Estero and had 
diversified its portfolio in sectors as diverse as wineries, pharmaceuticals, banking and the oil industry 
(Ducci, 2007: 96, 99)81.  
 
After the exit of Azurix, Saur International continued acting as OSM‟s technical operator and the 
commercial viability of operations depended on keeping withholding payment of the yearly royalty 
and implementing a minimum level of investments (Ducci, 2007: 99). In early April 2007, Saur 
announced it was leaving OSM and was exiting from all its Latin American operations. The Sielecki 
group was interested in acquiring control of OSM. The provincial government‟s requests to the new 
concessionaire included carrying out the expansion of service and the adjustment of employee salaries 
in exchange for a 19.7% tariff increase82. Less than two weeks after the announcement of Saur‟s 
departure, Saur announced it had suspended its ICSID claim for 6 months, while the provincial 
government declared that it was ready to renegotiate the contract and that it was not certain whether 
Saur would leave OSM or not83.       
 
4.1.8. Aguas de Misiones: Dragados get EIB finance and EU political risk cover 
In August 1999, Servicios de Aguas de Misiones SA (SAMSA) was awarded a 30-year water supply 
and sanitation concession in the cities of Posadas and Garupá, in the Misiones province. SAMSA was 
27% owned by Urbaser, 18% owned by Dragados, 45% owned by Urbaser Argentina and 10% owned 
by workers (Guidek et al., 2005). Effectively, the Dragados group owned 90% of SAMSA as Urbaser 
was a Dragados subsidiary84.  
 
The first five year investment programme amounted to US$ 63 million and in January 2001 the EIB 
lent US$ 18 million for 15 years, which were guaranteed under the EU budget guarantee programme 
against political risks including currency transfer, expropriation and war and civil disturbance (Hall 
and Lobina, 2002: 15) 85. 
 
In July 2006, SAMSA announced that it had invested Peso 30 million (US$ 9.74 million) and had 
carried out works in conjunction with the provincial government for further Peso 60 million (US$ 
19.5 million). This suggests that there was a considerable delay in the implementation of the first five 
year investment programme. The Peso 60 million works were 25% financed by SAMSA and 75% 
financed through a World Bank loan provided to Argentine governmental agency ENHOSA86.      
 
SAMSA stated that water supply coverage had increased by 27% and sewerage by 72% since 1999. 
“Samsa has also implemented a series of social measures designed to make payment for services 
easier for the lower earners in the area, with payment facilities, financing and charges tailored to 
customers. The firm has also forged around 60 different neighborhood agreements with the backing of 
provincial water and sewerage regulator Eprac, each adapted to the requirements of the particular 
areas served”87. 
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In May 2006, SAMSA rejected claims in the local press that it had requested a hike in water rates to 
ensure the economic viability of operations. Local newspaper Linea Capital had also claimed that 
SAMSA had threatened not to implement part of the projected investments unless tariffs were 
increased, and that it was considering withdrawing from the concession88. At the time of writing there 
was no sign that a renegotiation or indeed a cancellation of the concession was imminent.    
 
4.1.9. Proactiva’s Catamarca water concession cancelled and to be re-tendered 
In April 2000, FCC and Vivendi joint subsidiary Proactiva Medio Ambiente won the Catamarca water 
concession in Argentina prevailing over Urbaser. Proactiva won the 30-year concession after offering 
to pay 12.5% of annual billing to the provincial government, while Urbaser had offered 12.35% (Hall 
and Lobina, 2002: 15)89. Proactiva Medio Ambiente is 50% owned by FCC (Fomento de 
Construcciones y Contratas) and 50% by Veolia90. In July 2004, Veolia decided to sell all the shares it 
held in FCC91. 
 
Proactiva‟s Catamarca concessionaire was Aguas del Valle, which replaced the state-owned company 
Obras Sanitarias Catamarca in provincial capital San Fernando del Valle de Catamarca and the 
departments Valle Viejo and Fray Mamerto Esquiú, where 80% of the province‟s population lives. 
After September 2000, Obras Sanitarias Catamarca continued providing water services in the rest of 
the Catamarca province92.  
 
Reportedly, “services did not improve as expected and to make matters worse the devaluation brought 
about a freeze in charges and the concessionaire failed to make the promised investments, much as in 
the other failed water concessions in the country”. As a result, in December 2004 the provincial 
government and the concessionaire agreed to terminate the contract. Aguas del Valle would have 
continued operations until operations were handed over to a new concessionaire. In June 2007, local 
authorities were still working on defining the tender rules for the award of the new concession. Aguas 
del Valle, and Argentine firms Sielecki group, LatinAguas and the Cordoban investors in Aguas 
Cordobesas were said to be interested in bidding for the concession93.    
 
The new concession, with a duration limited to 10 years with a 5 year extension option, would 
effectively be a lease contract as the private operator would be required to finance operating costs and 
maintenance. Conversely, the provincial government would be responsible for financing infrastructure 
investment, including the construction of an aqueduct and wastewater treatment plant, the installation 
of meters and the expansion of services outside the concession area94. Under typical concessions, the 
private operator is required to finance all operating and capital costs, including maintenance and 
infrastructure investment. 
 
The above provisions were clearly aimed at reducing the performance risk faced by the private 
operator and facilitating the economic viability of the contract. It remains to be seen whether Aguas 
del Valle would have a competitive advantage over the other bidders due to its knowledge of the 
system. The submitted bids would be judged on the basis of the lowest price for cubic metre of water, 
as water would be metered. Also, local authorities were not expecting water charges to increase 
immediately95.    
 
4.1.10. Argentine-owned concessions: Latinaguas and South Water 
A number of private concessions have been awarded to operators exclusively owned by Argentine 
firms, such as Latinaguas of the Chamás group and South Water (also known as Sagua SA) of the 
Sielecki group.  
 
Latinaguas provides 1.59 million residents with potable water and 1.11 million with sewerage service 
in 132 localities through concessions in three provinces: Corrientes, Salta and la Rioja (Hall and 
Lobina, 2002: 15). The Aguas de Corrientes concession started in 1991 and covers the province 
capital and 10 of the province‟s largest cities (Ducci, 2007: 64). The original 30-year duration was 
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extended following renegotiation in December 2004, so that the due date of expiry was postponed 
from 2021 to 2026. This followed the provincial government‟s refusal to grant a 12% tariff increase 
and demands to postpone implementation of the investment programme. In February 2005, local 
authorities were reportedly considering terminating the concession “due to alleged contractual non-
compliance”96. However, at the time of writing the concession was still operating. 
 
The Aguas de Salta concession started in July 1998 (Ducci, 2007: 64) and planned to invest some 
US$ 90 million97. However, in October 2005 a neighbourhood association in the town of Metan 
accused the concessionaire of not having “invested enough to modernize its obsolete infrastructure” 
and called for the provincial government to renationalise operations. “Around 70% of households in 
the town consume bottled water because they are not convinced by the company's water treatment 
processes. On top of that, last summer most homes in the town were left without water for nearly a 
month”98. In January 2002, the provincial regulator fined Aguas de Salta “some US$22,000 for not 
responding to client complaints”99. In November 2003, a 10% equity stake in the concessionaire was 
to be transferred to 674 former employees100.  
  
The Aguas de la Rioja 30-year concession started in April 2002 (Ducci, 2007: 64) after the Latinaguas 
group had been awarded a management contract in the same concession area in 1999. The concession, 
which could be extended for a further 10 years at its expiry, covered the provincial capital of la Rioja 
and the cities of Chilecito and Chamical101. Awarded after the breakout of the Argentine crisis, the 
concession benefited from public financing from national agency ENHOSA and parts of the works 
were financed by the monthly fee paid by the concessionaire to local authorities102.  
 
Latinaguas is trying to expand its water activities both in Argentina and internationally. In 2005, 
Latinaguas attempted to buy Suez‟ shares in Santa Fe concessionaire APSF together with the 
Argentine Taselli group, but the attempt failed due to Suez refusal to abandon the ICSID case as a 
condition to the deal. Latinaguas and Buenos Aires province workers cooperative “5 de setiembre” 
were to jointly operate the concession
103
. In June 2007, LatinAguas was reportedly interested in 
bidding for the new Catamarca concession104. Internationally, Latinaguas holds a concession in 
Tumbes, Peru and in early 2007 it was bidding for a concession in Piura-Paita, Peru and a technical 
services contract in Brazil‟s Goiás state. In October 2006, Latinaguas pre-qualified for the Quito 
concession in Ecuador but plans to privatise Emaap were cancelled in march 2007 following a public 
campaign105.  
 
South Water holds the Aguas de Formosa concession in Clorinda, the capital of the Formosa province, 
since December 1995 and the Aguas de Santiago concession in 4 cities in the province of Santiago del 
Estero since 1997 (Ducci, 2007: 64). The Sielecki group has also an important equity stake in 
Mendoza concessionaire OSM Mendoza and in June 2007 it was said to be interested in bidding for 
the new Catamarca concession106. 
4.2. Bolivia 
 
4.2.1. Privatisation and renationalisation in La Paz, El Alto 
The private concession in La Paz was awarded to the Suez-led consortium Aguas de Illimani (AISA) 
in 1997. Like the Aguas Argentinas contract, the AISA concession has been portrayed as a success 
story, and particularly as a “pro-poor” PPP, for some time until events led to its termination.   
 
The contract included explicit targets for extending connections to poor households, including the El 
Alto area, but the contract was re-interpreted to allow a range of different services according to ability 
to pay (Komives, 1999: 30-34). 107  The techniques used here by Suez to make the extensions 
profitable included involvement of community groups, the use of micro-credit schemes and voluntary 
labour by the inhabitants to make connections, and the use of the shallow „condominial‟ sewerage 
system. All these elements were problematic, with community leaders organising protests at the 
working of the concession, and the economic viability of the condominial system is dependent on free 
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labour (Laurie & Crespo, 2002). 108  One further problem with making the service profitable was due 
to the very low daily consumption levels in El Alto (Hall and Lobina, 2007). Crespo (2004) explains 
consumption patterns in terms of generalised poverty and the fact that El Alto is a dormitory city of 
La Paz, which implies high variations in terms of population between daytime and night, rather than 
in terms of cultural habits.  109  
 
Despite the positive image internationally enjoyed by AISA until recently, mostly resulting from the 
PR efforts of the private operator and the international and bilateral agencies backing it, the 
concession proved controversial since its inception. Crespo (2004) shows how social resistance to the 
concession was constant across time, although varying in strategy adopted. The El Alto 
neighbourhood association FEJUVE played a pivotal role in organising social resistance, but its 
strength can be explained as people of different walks of life joined together in protesting against poor 
service and high connection charges110. FEJUVE persistently exerted pressure on the Bolivian 
government to obtain the termination of the concession, which was eventually decided in January 
2005 by the Carlos Mesa administration. This took place two days after FEJUVE declared an 
indefinite road blockade until the rescission of the AISA concession, in an escalation of 
confrontational initiatives from the initial rallies and protest marches111. The contract was officially 
ended in January 2007 under President Evo Morales after amicable negotiations providing for the 
Bolivian government to assume responsibility for AISA‟s loans, amounting to US$ 9.6 million, and 
pay US$ 5.5 million as compensation to AISA‟s shareholders. Bolivian officials had been induced to 
enter amicable negotiations rather than resorting to unilateral termination in order to avoid alienating 
international financial institutions, which they hoped could finance the operations of newly 
established public water provider Epsas112. Amicable negotiations also allowed for avoiding entering 
an international arbitration dispute in front of ICSID113. In April 2007, Bolivian Minister for Water 
Abel Mamani requested and obtained that regulator SISAB removed the indexation of tariffs to the 
US Dollar. Epsas tariffs and connection charges would thus increase by 6% per year114. The Bolivian 
government has written off the US$ 9.5 million debt assumed by Epsas towards a number of financial 
institutions and had received US$ 5.5. million from the Venezuelan government to devote to Epsas 
investment programme. The introduction of public participation in Epsas decision making through the 
involvement of social movements and the municipal governments of La Paz and El Alto is being 
proposed. The introduction of public participation within regulatory activities via the constitution of a 
multi-stakeholder regulatory body is also being discussed (Ducci, 2007: 115-116).      
 
Scrutiny of the AISA concession 
In September 2005, water regulator SISAB (Superintendencia de Saneamiento Basico) contracted 
Bolivian firm Pozo & Asociados to carry out an independent audit on AISA‟s activities from August 
1997 to December 2005. The audit, which also provided the grounds for the termination of the 
contract, pointed to the private operator‟s failure to comply with contractual targets in terms of 
connecting households to the pipeline network. From 1997 to 2001, AISA made a total of 46,438 
connections to the water supply network in El Alto, failing to realise 25,314 connections or 35.28% of 
the contractual target. As regards the sewerage network in La Paz, AISA failed to realise 12,479 
connections corresponding to 32.84% of the contractual target. The auditors also found signs of 
“arbitrary” tariff increases in sample bills corresponding to 12 billing periods (SISAB, 2006). 
 
A study carried out by SAMAPA Residual, the public company entrusted with the supervision of the 
assets given in concession to AISA, found out that tariffs charged by AISA were overvalued by about 
20%. More precisely, the tariffs had been calculated to allow for the reimbursement of the 
investments carried out by public operator SAMAPA and so AISA was charging users US$ 8.9 
million. However, the fee paid by AISA for the use of infrastructure built by SAMAPA amounted to 
only US$ 3.5 million per year, a sum which was projected to gradually decrease in the course of the 
concession. Furthermore, tariffs were fixed in US$ to protect the operator from currency risk and 
guaranteed a rate of return on investment of 12% (Crespo, 2004). The Pozo & Asociados audit found 
out that in the 8 years of operations analysed AISA‟s actual rate of return exceeded 15%. Despite 
AISA‟s claims of having invested US$ 51.7 million, the audit estimated that investments actually 
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realised by the private operator amounted to some US$ 23.6 million for a net value of US$ 19.9 
million after depreciation, compared to the US$ 42.2 million claimed by AISA (Pozo & Asociados, 
2006).     
 
The Pozo & Asociados audit revealed that AISA had entered a contract with shareholder Suez in 
which it undertook to remunerate the parent company for the transferred technology, know how and 
technical assistance, as well as for its assistance to management. The contract provided for the 
payment of a yearly management fee equal to 8% of the operator‟s EBIDTA (Earnings Before 
Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization). In addition, AISA committed in advance to paying a 
fix sum for technical assistance of US$ 155,000 for the first year of the contract, US$ 230,000 for the 
second and an amount to be agreed for the third year (SISAB, 2006). The management and technical 
assistance contract thus allowed Suez to extract more profits from the concession than those resulting 
from dividends paid by AISA. The Pozo & Asociados audit calculated that from 1997 to December 
2005 the total amount perceived by the Suez group under the management and technical assistance 
agreement with AISA corresponded to more than US$ 11 million. Although AISA had computed such 
as operating costs, the auditors described it as a form of dividend nearing the amount of capital 
contributed by the concessionaire (Pozo & Asociados, 2006).  
 
Based on the findings of the audit and taking into consideration AISA‟s response, in December 2006 
SISAB sanctioned AISA with a US$ 50,000 fine for a number of irregularities, including less than 
transparent accounting and reporting practices and failure to realise works according to the agreed 
technical standards (SISAB, 2006). SISAB‟s head Álvaro Camacho admitted that for the duration of 
AISA's concession, SISAB's control over the private operator had been "weak"115. 
 
4.2.2. Privatisation and renationalisation in Cochabamba 
In September 1999, the International Water-led consortium Aguas del Tunari was awarded a 40-year 
concession for the water and sanitation system of Cochabamba, the third largest city in the country 
with some 500,000 inhabitants (Hall and Lobina, 2002: 15-16). The award to the private operator was 
characterised by lack of transparency (Lobina, 2000; Jouravlev, 2004: 39). Water tariffs increased by 
up to 150% (Jouravlev, 2004: 39) in order to cover the costs of the Misicuni project, a massive 
engineering scheme causing water to cost “roughly six times that of alternative sources” and provide 
for a guaranteed 15% real return (Hall and Lobina, 2002: 15-16). Tariffs were also indexed to the US$ 
(Jouravlev, 2004: 39). The massive tariff hikes hit the people of Cochabamba where the minimum 
wage was less than US$100 per month. The average water bill was estimated to equal 22% of the 
monthly pay of a self-employed man and 27% of that of a woman. The concession was terminated in 
April 2000, following social unrest and military repression which left one person dead, two blinded 
and several injured (Lobina, 2000; Hall and Lobina, 2002: 15-16).  
 
Social opposition to the concession was led by the Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida 
(The Co-ordinator for the Defence of Water and Life), an alliance including the trade union 
representing minimum-wage factory workers, peasant farmers, environmentalists and youth (Lobina, 
2000). In parallel with the pattern of events in El Alto, the Coordinadora “began to stage rallies and 
protest marches, escalating later to roadblocks that brought the city to a standstill. Support for the 
movement spread through local assemblies meeting, attracting a cross-section of the population rarely 
see taking action together”116. Jouravlev (2004: 39) and Sjölander Holland (2005: 23-35) identify lack 
of public participation in the decision making preceding the introduction of reforms and 
dissatisfaction with the provisions of a law affecting the allocation of water rights to indigenous 
people and farmers as further factors provoking social unrest. 
 
Full cost pricing contributed to exasperating Cochabamba‟s consumers. In June 1999, the World 
Bank‟s review of public expenditure in Bolivia recommended that “no subsidies should be given to 
ameliorate the increase in water tariffs in Cochabamba, which should reflect the full cost of provision 
of the Misicuni multipurpose project”. Later, the review document expanded on the point: "so far the 
Government has made the clear decision that there will be no public subsidy ... and that the users will 
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pay in full for the [water] services [in Cochabamba]. It is critical that the Government maintains this 
position." This would have the obvious effect of placing all the burden of the over US$ 200m 
Misicuni project and the guaranteed 15% real return on consumers117 (Lobina, 2000; Hall and Lobina, 
2002: 15-16). 
 
Table: Estimated savings for Cochabamba consumers in 2001, as a result of termination of the Aguas del 
Tunari concession  
 
USER CATEGORY 
TOTAL 
SAVINGS 
FOR 2001 
YEARLY SAVINGS 
PER HOUSEHOLD 
OR BUSINESS 
% OF THE 
MONTHLY 
MINIMUM 
WAGE 
Empty land $27,550  $9.41 14% 
The very poor $439,423 $19.73 29% 
The poor $748,323 $40.16 60% 
Middle class + $1,042,765 $110.12 164% 
Commercial users $1,211,888 $208.98 312% 
TOTAL/AVERAGE $3,469,952 $58.71 87% 
 
Sources: SEMAPA computer records; http://www.democracyctr.org/bechtel/waterbills/waterbills-global.htm.  
 
In November 2001, International Water's subsidiary Aguas del Tunari filed a US$ 25m compensation 
claim with the World Bank's ICSID (International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes) 
(Hall and Lobina, 2002: 15-16). In January 2006, Aguas del Tunari decided to settle the dispute 
against the token payment of Bolivianos 2 (US$ 0.30). The Democracy Center, a US-based NGO 
involved in organising protests at the compensation demand against the cash strapped Bolivian 
government, commented “Sources directly involved in the settlement negotiations cited continued 
international citizen pressure as the reason the companies decided to drop the case”118.  
 
After the termination of the Aguas del Tunari concession, operations were handed over to the 
municipal undertaking SEMAPA. SEMAPA‟s Board of Directors has been restructured to allow for 
broader stakeholder participation. In its new composition, the Board includes Cochabamba‟s mayor 
acting as the Board chairman, another representative of the municipal administration, 3 
representatives of Cochabamba‟s consumers, one trade union representative and a representative of 
the association of professions (appointed by the mayor). Nonetheless, SEMAPA‟s performance has 
been mixed. On the one hand, service coverage has increased to 70%, much more than coverage 
levels when the Aguas del Tunari concession was awarded, and the number of connections from 2000 
to 2004 has exceeded the operating targets initially set for Aguas del Tunari. On the other, the 
expansion in service coverage has mainly benefited the urban centre and its relatively more affluent 
dwellers while the expansion of service to southern peri-urban areas has been postponed. This means 
that low income consumers are not connected to the pipeline network and buy water delivered by tank 
or other means at much higher prices than those charged by SEMAPA. Furthermore, service 
continuity is only 60% and Unaccounted-for-Water is above 50%. There has been a marked increased 
in the number of workers with the ratio number of employees/‟000s connection growing from 5.77 in 
2002 to 11.52 in 2003, as workers raised from 270 to 700. Some observers have explained this with 
the influence within SEMAPA‟s Board of Directors of the trade unions and the mayor, who have 
purportedly established a firm political alliance. Consumer representation within SEMAPA would 
have conversely been weakened by lack of interest in the population and low turn out at elections of 
users‟ representatives. Finally, SEMAPA is affected by heavy debts of US$ 24 million as of 2004. 
Debt would have been made worse by the freezing of tariffs for 5 years, resulting in a decrease by 
21% in real terms. In November 2005 tariffs were increased by 7.5% and in May 2006 by a further 
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
17/05/2010  Page 30 of 60 
   
5% so that tariffs went back at 1999 levels in real terms. This was requested by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) as a condition to issue a loan. Further conditions imposed by the IDB 
include the reduction of number of employees/‟000s connections to 4 and to reorganise the 
managerial structure of the municipal operator (Ducci, 2007: 122-124)119.          
 
4.3. Brazil 
As of September 2005, there were a total of 63 concessions for water supply and sanitation services 
covering 7 million consumers120. The majority of these were of relatively small dimensions. In fact, 
without considering Veolia‟s participation in and operational control of Parana state‟s Sanepar which 
served on its own more than 7.5 million inhabitants121, only 4 concessions awarded to MNCs 
accounted for 35% of the total covering an aggregate population of 2,450,000 inhabitants. At the time 
of writing, of the above 5 operations (including Sanepar), three had been abandoned by the 
multinational operators and two had been affected by persistent problems. In all cases where the 
MNCs had completed their exit, there was no instance of re-nationalisation as local companies bought 
the respective shares.  
 
A number of major state-owned water companies has been semi-privatised by listing on the stock 
exchange. This was the case of Sao Paulo‟s Sabesp with its 25 million consumers which make it the 
largest water operator in Brazil, and Minas Gerais‟ Copasa which is the third largest Brazilian water 
supply and sanitation operator with its 11.1 million people served122. Public operations are not only 
carried out by state-owned PLCs (Public Limited Companies or joint stock companies), but also by 
municipally-owned operators, a number of which have proved to be efficient and effective service 
providers.       
 
4.3.1. Suez leaves Aguas de Limeira concession 
In 1995 Aguas de Limeira, a consortium 50% owned by Brazilian firm Odebrecht and 50% by Suez, 
was awarded a 30-year concession for the provision of water supply and sanitation services to the city 
of Limeira (250,000 inhabitants) in the state of Sao Paulo. The concession has been marred by 
allegations of corruption and legal disputes over its cancellation (Ducci, 2007: 160).  
 
Estimates indicate that under the concession water supply coverage increased from 87% in 1995 to 
100% in 2002, sewerage coverage from 80% to 100% in the same period. Also, Unaccounted-For-
Water would be at 16% and customer satisfaction at 98% (Ducci, 2007: 160-161). However, Vargas 
(2003: 41) points to a more mixed picture including doubts on the reliability of the company‟s claims. 
“There was also a small improvement in services expansion, whose rates were already high, and a 
broad investment in sewage treatment … On the other hand, there are strong suspicions … of 
manipulation on data about the investments made and the contract goals”. 
 
In June 2006, Aguas de Limeira was brought to court for breach of contract in relation to untreated 
wastewater discharge (Ducci, 2007: 161). By February 2007, Suez had left and Aguas de Limeira was 
wholly owned by Odebrecht123.   
 
4.3.2. Manaus concession: Aguas do Amazonas  
In June 2000, Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux was awarded a 30-year water and wastewater concession in 
Manaus (1.2m inhabitants), Amazonia state, Brazil (Hall & Lobina, 2002: 18). The concession has 
been marred by conflicts between the private operator and local authorities on the state of the 
infrastructure prior to the award and contractual compliance. The concessionaire has been fined a total 
of US$ 2 million for poor service quality. The prospects of the concession have been described as 
“extremely precarious” and a possible termination has been announced (Ducci, 2007: 162). At the 
time of writing there was no sign of Suez exiting the concession, although Suez had been reported 
having made the decision to withdraw from Brazil altogether124. 
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4.3.3. Agbar leaves Aguas de Guariroba concession in Campo Grande, Mato Grosso 
In July 2000, the Suez-Agbar venture Interagua won a US$ 217m, 30-year water supply and sewerage 
concession in Campo Grande, the capital of Brazil's state of Mato Grosso do Sul (750,000 
inhabitants)125. The joint venture was initially reported as being Interagua, but in December 2000 
AgBar said the joint venture was called Aguas de Guariroba, 50% owned by Agbar, 41% by Cobel, 
and 9% by Mato Grosso state water company Sanesul. Agbar, which owns 53% of Interagua, was the 
operator of the Campo Grande concession (Hall and Lobina, 2002: 18).  
 
As a result of a generalised delay in the achievement of investment targets, in December 2003 the 
municipal government put Aguas de Guariroba under administration for 90 days. Investigations found 
undue costs of around US$ 2 million. Also, investment targets were redefined in order to make up for 
the due investments and meet targets for 2004. 
 
In November 2005, as part of its strategy to reduce its presence in Latin America and leave Brazil, 
Agbar sold its shares in Aguas de Guariroba to local investors Bertin group and Equipav for US$ 26 
million (Ducci, 2007: 162-163). By February 2006, the Bertin/Equipav consortium had bought 
Cobel‟s stake in Aguas de Guariroba and was planning to buy the remaining 9% held by Sanesul126.  
 
4.3.4. Aguas de Portugal leaves Prolagos concession, Rio de Janeiro lake district 
In late 2000, Aguas de Portugal took over Brazilian water company Prolagos, which held a water 
supply and sanitation concession and serving around 250,000 people in the Rio de Janeiro lakes 
district. Portuguese state-owned Aguas de Portugal held a 93.5% stake in Prolagos (Hall and Lobina, 
2002: 18). 
 
In July 2007, Aguas de Portugal was completing the sale of Prolagos after reportedly facing “serious 
difficulties” in making returns on investments127.  
 
4.3.5. Sanepar 
In 1998 Parana state part-privatised its state water company Sanepar and became the first Brazilian 
state water supply and sanitation company to open its capital up to private partners. Sanepar served a 
over 7.5 million consumers128. At the time of writing, Sanepar was 52.5% owned by the Parana state 
and 34.7% by the consortium Domino Holding, including French water MNC Veolia and the 
Brazilian Andrade Gutierrez Group. However, Parana state had 60% of voting power, with 39.7% in 
the hands of the private operator Domino Holding129. The World Bank‟s IFC was an indirect investor 
in Sanepar130 as in November 2001 it decided to invest US$30m in acquiring a 16% stake in AGC. 
The concession has been controversial, with alleged poor service quality, less than transparent 
practices and problems in delivery to the poor. It has also seen protracted conflicts between the state 
of Parana and private shareholder Domino over the validity of the concession agreement and the 
effective control of management (Hall and Lobina, 2002: 16-17). 
 
In February 2003, the shareholder agreement was declared void on grounds of lack of investment and 
tariff increases. In June 2004, the state government proposed a capital increase that would have 
produced the effect to reduce Domino‟s shareholding to 20%. The consortium resorted to the courts 
and in September 2007 the Supreme Federal Court ruled in favour of Domino, so that the validity of 
the shareholder agreement was re-established. Parana‟s state government declared its intention to 
appeal against the ruling. In September 2005, Veolia had announced it would withdraw from the 
contract and try to sell its shares to the state government for US$ 200 million (Ducci, 2007: 161)131. 
However, at the time of writing there was no sign of Veolia having exited Domino Holding and 
Sanepar.  
 
Interestingly, in September 2006 rating agency Moody‟s explained Sanepar‟s improved credit rating 
and financial performance in light of tariff increases and support from Parana‟s state government “in 
the form of advances and reduced dividends”132.     
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4.3.6. Sao Paulo’s Sabesp semi-privatisation 
As a wholly state-owned water company for the state of Sao Paulo, SABESP managed to 
considerably improve its efficiency and effectiveness following in-house restructuring from 1995 to 
1998 (Lobina and Hall, 2000: 49-50). It is deemed to be the world's largest water company, with 25 
million customers.  
 
In 2002, state authorities decided to list Sabesp on the New York stock exchange in order to raise 
budget capital through the sale of shares133. At the time of writing, Sabesp was 50.3% owned by Sao 
Paulo state and 49.7% listed on the stock exchange, of which 27.6% of shares floated on the Sao 
Paulo stock exchange (BOVESPA) and 22.1% floated on the New York stock exchange (NYSE)134. 
According to Ducci (2007: 159), the municipality of Sao Paulo has threatened not to renew the 
concession to Sabesp.   
 
In July 2007, Sabesp declared that it was seeking alternative financial sources to traditional public 
funds in order to raise capital for urgent works. For example, alternative financial mechanisms could 
have included the issuance of bonds. Problems with traditional public funds were that “The credit 
lines offered by the federal government as part of PAC are weighed down by excessive bureaucracy”. 
Furthermore, “investment funds such as the federal workers' protection fund FAT provide funds at 
low interest rates, but require that lengthy project analysis be concluded before the funds can be 
authorized”135.  
 
In November 2006, Sabesp and Lima, Peru‟s state owned utility SEDAPAL were planning to set up a 
joint venture to provide water supply to seven districts located in Lima's southern area. The Peruvian 
government presented the deal as a public-public partnership despite Sabesp being a semi-privatised 
company. This means that the proposed joint venture and its future operations are more likely to 
represent a PPP (public-private partnership) or a WOP (Water Operator Partnership) in case 
collaboration was on a not-for-profit basis136. 
 
4.3.7. Minas Gerais Copasa semi-privatised 
In February 2006, Minas Gerais state-owned water supply and sanitation company Copasa was listed 
on the Sao Paulo stock exchange137. At the time of writing, COPASA was 59.77% owned by the 
Minas Gerais state, 9.67% owned by the Belo Horizonte municipal administration and 30.24% floated 
on the stock exchange138. In September 2007, Minas Gerais state and the Belo Horizonte municipal 
government were planning to sell part of their shares in COPASA, in order to raise Reais 300 million 
(US$ 161 million) and fund state government works. More precisely, the shares to be sold were bonds 
issued in July 2007 that were convertible to shares139.   
 
In September 2007, COPASA and the Paraguayan state water utility Essap signed an agreement for 
the provision of technical assistance on a not-for-profit basis under the UN Water Operator 
Partnership initiative. COPASA would provide technical assistance aimed at helping Essap reduce 
water leakage by 15.5% in one year. “Copasa will assist in drawing up a diagnosis for the potable 
water provision system serving Asunción and the metropolitan area; defining, coordinating, 
supervising and implementing an action plan to reduce loses; training Essap staff to implement the 
plan and reduce losses; and transferring control and water network loss reduction technologies. Essap 
will replace some 50km of pipelines, install some 60,000 new water meters and launch a meter testing 
system, among others” 140.  
 
4.3.8. Goias state Saneago 
In February 2007, Goias state water utility Saneago was to award a contract for the management of its 
commercial operations. Saneago expected the successful bidder to invest around Reais 5.5. million in 
the management of commercial services. It received 6 bids including from Minais Gerais‟ COPASA 
and a consortium participated by Argentine private water operator Latinaguas. The contract was going 
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to be financed by an IDB loan which was issued in 2005 upon the condition that the private sector was 
involved in Saneago‟s operations. The loan was part of a Reais 200 million (US$ 95.2 million) IDB-
funded waterworks project for state capital Goiânia141. 
 
4.3.9. Successful municipal water operations throughout Brazil 
Brazilian association of municipal water operators ASSEMAE has published the booklet "Successful 
Experiences in Municipal Public Water and Sanitation Services from Brazil" (Exito). The document 
presents twenty examples of successful municipal water supply and sanitation operators in large and 
small, wealthy and poor municipalities across Brazil. These include renowned cases such as Porto 
Alegre‟s DMAE, on which also see Hall et al. (2002), and Campinas‟ municipally-owned PLC 
SANASA. Experiences range from financially sound operations to democratic participatory decision 
making142.   
 
4.4. Chile 
The water privatisations in Chile started in 1999, by the sale of shares in existing public sector water 
companies and the concurrent award of long term concessions, and virtually cover all the country. In 
most cases, service coverage had already been expanded considerably by public water operators prior 
to the privatisations, which focused on enhancing wastewater treatment. In some cases, as in Santiago 
de Chile, public operators had been regarded as efficient even by the World Bank (Hall and Lobina, 
2002: 18-19).  
 
Weaknesses in the Chilean regulatory framework have exacerbated the asymmetry of information in 
favour of private operators. Furthermore, weaknesses in the conflict resolution mechanism have 
meant that private operators have more often rather than not prevailed in the recurrent disputes with 
the regulator and managed to control the system (Jouravlev, 2004: 30, 44-45). Finally, the social 
impact of tariff increases is mitigated by a system of targeted subsidies to low income consumers 
(Jouravlev, 2004: 52). 
 
The ownership structure of water operators has undergone considerable changes in the last few years, 
as a result of the exit of a number of MNCs. This has been partly compensated by the entry of local 
investors and eventually of Canadian investment fund Ontario Teachers Pension Plan (OTPP), one of 
Canada‟s largest public investment funds with over Cdn$ 106 billion (US$ 106 billion) in assets. 
While Suez has only formally withdrawn from the Chilean market, by selling its shares to Agbar, this 
is a partially-owned Suez subsidiary so that the group retains its presence in Chile, unlike other Latin 
American countries.  
 
By contrast, Thames Water and Anglian Water have sold of their shares in ESSBIO and ESVAL, the 
second and third largest Chilean water utilities, respectively to an Argentine private investment fund 
and a consortium of Chilean firms, only for OTPP to take over both companies. OTPP is attracted by 
the reliability of the investment, providing low-risk, inflation-adjusted, long term returns. As a result 
of its acquisition of Thames Water and Anglian Water‟s Chilean operations, OTPP controlled 36.4% 
of the Chilean water market and became the second largest player in the market after Agbar, holding a 
38.4% share. This has produced a high level of concentration, with the two companies controlling 
together controlling almost 75% of the Chilean water and wastewater market143.    
 
4.4.1. Agbar stays in Santiago de Chile’s Aguas Andinas 
In June 1999, a Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux/Aguas de Barcelona consortium bought 42% of the shares 
of Santiago de Chile‟s water company EMOS (then renamed Aguas Andinas) for US$ 957 million. 
The private consortium was also awarded an unlimited duration concession to manage and develop 
the city‟s water and sewerage system (Lobina and Hall, 2003). Other shareholders include the Chilean 
government‟s economic development agency CORFO, holding a 35% stake, and pension funds, 
company employees and other investors (World Bank and PPIAF, 2006: 242). Aguas Andinas claims 
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to have expanded wastewater treatment from 7% in 1999 to 70% in 2006144 and the contract is 
regarded as a success in terms of increased service quality, investment and profitability (Lee and 
Floris, 2003: 286; Jouravlev, 2004: 35).  
 
However, in June 1999 Suez took over an efficient and effective company with limited need, if any at 
all, for organisational restructuring, which would operate under a familiar regulatory framework. It 
also acquired a captive wastewater treatment market to exploit. The duration of the concession meant 
that, as the private operator of Aguas Andinas, Suez had been shielded from competition in 
perpetuity. In addition, it reportedly enjoyed a “constant level of profitability, of roughly one-third of 
total sales, … guaranteed by the state”145 (Lobina and Hall, 2003). 
 
According to Gómez-Lobo and Vargas (2002, 2001) and Gómez-Lobo (2003), as cited in Jouravlev 
(2004: 24, 35), the first rate-review process after the privatisation of EMOS generated concerns over 
the effectiveness of the regulatory framework under private operations. In 2000, tariffs increased by 
an average of 20% in real terms for water supply and sewerage, irrespective of virtually universal 
coverage having been achieved in both sub-sectors. Subsequently, wastewater treatment would have 
accounted for 25% of total tariffs. 
 
In April 2004, Suez sold 31% of its shares in Aguas Andinas to its partly-owned subsidiary Agbar in 
order to raise capital for other ventures. This allowed Agbar to assume control of Aguas Andinas, 
which was 51% owned by the Suez/Agbar consortium and served over 38% of Chile‟s consumers. 
Aguas Andinas represented the most important single international operation held by Agbar. In May 
2006, Agbar declared that its strategy for Latin America was to retain its position in Chile, 
ACUACAR (Cartagena, Colombia), Aguas del Saltillo (Mexico) and in Aguas de la Habana and 
Aguas de Varadero (Cuba). Also, Chile would have been used as a base from which to sell technical 
and consulting services to other Latin American countries, but without foreseeing any further direct 
investment. In November 2005, holding company Inversiones Aguas Metropolitanas, through which 
Agbar and Suez controlled Aguas Andinas, was floated on the stock exchange. The sale of 49.9% of 
Inversiones Aguas Metropolitanas shares generated revenues of US$ 458 million for Agbar and Suez 
(Ducci, 2007: 129, 142).  
 
4.4.2. Ontario Teachers Pension Fund takes over ESSEL, ESSBIO and Aguas Nuevo Sur del 
Maule 
In November 1999, a joint venture between UK water MNC Thames Water and Portugal‟s state-
owned company Electricidade de Portugal (EDP) bought a 45% equity stake in ESSEL, the company 
providing water supply and sanitation services in Chile‟s region VI (Los Libertadores region). With 
ESSEL, Thames Water and EDP also acquired a water concession of indefinite duration. The 
remaining 55% of the capital was owned by Chilean government‟s economic development agency 
CORFO. In December 2001, Thames Water bought EDP‟s 50% in the consortium and so held 45% of 
ESSEL‟s shares in its own right (Ducci, 2007: 130). 
 
In September 2000, Thames Water bought 42% of the shares in ESSBIO, the company holding an 
unlimited water supply and sanitation concession in Chile‟s region VIII (Bio-Bio). Thames Water 
subsequently bought a 9% stake which was floated and came to hold 51% of ESSEL, while CORFO 
owned the remaining 49%. In October 2002, ESSEL and ESSBIO merged (Ducci, 2007: 130-131). 
 
In November 2001, Thames Water was the sole bidder and acquired 100% of Aguas Nuevo Sur del 
Maule which held a 30-year concession in Chile‟s region VII (Maule). Thames Water thus served 
20% of the country (Ducci, 2007: 129-131). 
 
ESSBIO failed to meet all the projected operational targets, and in 2004 it only achieved 86% of the 
goals set for region VI and a 37% for region VIII. Poor performance has been attributed to technical 
problems causing delays in the subcontracting of works but also to the decision of Thames Water‟s 
mother company RWE to slow down investment before selling the UK-based water MNC. Poor 
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performance resulted in a total US$ 5.1 million fines imposed by Chilean regulator SISS from 2001 to 
2004 (Ducci, 2007: 132-133). 
 
ESSBIO has also been investigated for alleged irregularities due to payments made by Chilean 
engineering company Hidrosán, one of ESSBIO‟s major providers of contracted out works, in 
exchange of Thames Water issuing invoices for US$ 3.6 million. At the time of writing judicial 
proceedings on the irregularities were still ongoing. However, upon CORFO‟s initiative, in September 
2005 an arbitration court condemned Thames Water to pay US$ 11.1 million in compensation to 
ESSBIO for the damage caused by the alleged irregularities. Payment of compensation was set by 
CORFO as a precondition to the sale of Thames Water‟s shares in ESSBIO and Aguas Nuevo Sur del 
Maule146.   
 
RWE had made a strategic decision to divest all its activities in the water sector and to sell Thames 
Water. In February 2006, the Argentine investment fund Southern Cross bought Thames Water‟s 
Chilean operations for US$ 300 million. Thames Water thus wrote off some US$ 200 million on the 
original values of its acquisitions (Ducci, 2007: 133-135). 
 
In August 2007, Southern Cross sold its 51% stake in ESSBIO and 100% of Aguas Nuevo Sur del 
Maule to the OTPP This was the first infrastructure investment carried out by OTPP in South 
America. OTPP explained that the Chilean regulatory framework guaranteed long term returns 
indexed to inflation, thus suitable to covering the cost of inflation-protected pensions for the 271,000 
teachers who were members of the plan. OTPP announced that the local management of ESSBIO and 
Aguas Nuevo Sur del Maule would remain in place despite the change in ownership. OTPP also 
declared its interest in investing in Latin American infrastructure and particularly in Chile, where it 
had spent 3-4 years studying the country‟s regulatory system: "we are interested in the infrastructure 
area in general and to us that includes electric, gas and water distribution, and it could also include 
tollroads, airports, ports and power plants"147. OTPP reportedly paid over US$ 500 million for buying 
the two companies, of which US$ 326 million for ESSBIO. When Southern Cross bought ESSBIO 
from Thames Water it paid US$ 222 million, plus an undisclosed amount for Aguas Nuevo Sur del 
Maule148.     
 
4.4.3. Anglian Water leaves ESVAL, OTPP to take over  
In December 1998, the Aguas Puerto consortium bought 40.41% of ESVAL, which held a water 
supply and sanitation concession in of indefinite duration in Chile‟s region V (Valparaiso). Aguas 
Puerto was composed by Chilean private electricity company Enersis (72%) and the UK water MNC 
Anglian Water (28%). ESVAL was also 38.89% owned by CORFO and 7.70% owned by pension 
funds. In August 2000, Anglian Water bought the shares held by Enersis in Aguas Puerto, which 
became a wholly owned subsidiary of Anglian Water. As a result of a capital increase in ESVAL‟s 
capital and the acquisition of the adjacent Aguas Quintas‟ contracts, Anglian Water had paid a total 
US$ 170 million and held a 49.82% equity stake in ESVAL (Ducci, 2007: 136-137). 
 
ESVAL‟s Unaccouted-for-Water remained effectively stable from 1998 to 2005, while efficiency was 
mainly achieved by reducing the number of workers. The number of employees to „000 connections 
ratio decreased from 2.3 in 2008 to 0.7 in 2005 (Ducci, 2007: 138). 
 
Confronted with the deteriorating profitability of its international operations, in November 2002 
Anglian Water decided to sell its international activities and refocus on core activities in the UK. In 
October 2003, a consortium made of Chilean group Fernandez Leon/Hurtado Vicuña and local 
investment vehicle Sociedad de Inversiones Moneda Asset bought Aguas Puerto for US$ 92 million. 
As a result, Fernandez Leon/Hurtado Vicuña owned 44.8% of ESVAL and Sociedad de Inversiones 
Moneda Asset owned 5%. Anglian Water wrote off some US$ 120 million (Ducci, 2007: 139-141).  
 
The Fernandez Leon and Hurtado Vicuña group, owner of Sociedad Almendral (formerly known as 
Chilquinta), had held the Aguas Quinta operations in region V from 1993 to 2000, before these were 
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acquired by ESVAL, and a concession in the city of Valvidia since 1995. In 2003, the Fernandez 
Leon and Hurtado Vicuña group also won an operating contract in the IV region and thus established 
operating company Aguas del Valle as a subsidiary of ESVAL. In addition, Fernandez Leon and 
Hurtado Vicuña‟s Sociedad Almendral was part of a consortium with Suez holding 98% of region X 
water supply and sanitation concessionaire Aguas Decima, until this was taken over by Marubeni in 
September 2006 (Ducci, 2007: 129, 141). Fernandez Leon and Hurtado Vicuña owned Chile‟s private 
telecoms operator Entel and had investments in the utilities, real estate, financial and mining 
sectors149. 
  
In August 2007, OTPP announced that it was to buy 48.92% of ESVAL shares for US$ 365 million 
which would also allow OTPP to acquire ESVAL‟s subsidiary Aguas del Valle. OTPP declared that 
“the investment is well suited to the pension plan's objective of providing stable, long-term returns to 
help pay teachers' pensions up to 70 years from now”. Both ESSBIO and ESVAL were expected to 
“provide stable low-risk returns, and they have a very long economic shelf life consistent with our 
long-term investment goals”. As in the case of ESSBIO‟s acquisition, ESVAL‟s management would 
keep in place irrespective of the change in ownership150. 
 
OTPP was expected to launch an offer for the acquisition of 100% of ESVAL‟s shares after the 
approval of the purchase of the 49% stake. However, state-owned agency CORFO ruled out selling its 
29.43% shares as the utility was “considered a strategic asset to the country”151. Completion of 
OTPP‟s purchase of ESVAL was expected to take place by end November 2007152.  
 
4.4.4. Iberdrola considers leaving ESSAL 
In July 1999, Spanish electricity group Iberdrola bought 51% of ESSAL, which held the water supply 
and sanitation concession for Chile‟s region X with the exception of the city of Valdivia. Iberdola 
made the strategic decision to divest its water activities and since 2001 out ESSAL for sale. Although 
it has received a number of offers, it has decided that none was worth accepting (Ducci, 2007: 141-
142). In September 2007, the Japanese conglomerates Marubeni and Matsui were both reportedly 
interested in acquiring Iberdola‟s stake in ESSAL153.  
 
4.4.5. Chilean-owned operations 
A number of other operations were in the hands of Chilean firms, altogether representing over 14.3% 
of Chilean consumers served (Ducci, 2007: 129).  
 
In 2006, the Solari group owned 99% of region IX concessionaire Aguas del Araucania, region I 
concessionaire Aguas del Altiplano and region XII concessionaire Aguas Magallanes (Ducci, 2007: 
129). In September 2007, Japanese conglomerates Marubeni and Mitsui were reportedly interested in 
acquiring the Solari family‟s vehicle Aguas Nuevas, through which it owned Aguas del Araucania, 
Aguas del Altiplano and Aguas Magallanes154. 
 
In December 2003, Chilean conglomerate Luksic group acquired a 30-year water concession in region 
II operated by Aguas de Antofagasta after submitting a bid of US$ 27 million. However, state-owned 
utility ESSAN remained responsible for the treatment of wastewater generated in the cities of 
Antofagasta and Calama, which it contracted to the UK-based MNC Biwater. Biwater held a 
concession to collect and treat 100% of Antofagasta wastewater until 2024. Also, in March 2001 it 
won a 20-year BOT contract for the construction of a US$ 6.32 million wastewater treatment plant in 
Calama but this was cancelled in January 2006 (Ducci, 2007: 129)155.  
 
In August 2007, a consortium of Chilean firms, made up of engineering company Hidrosan, Icafal 
Inversiones, and Vecta Inversiones, owned operations in regions III and XI. These included Aguas 
Chañar, that had won a 30-year operating contract from state-owned utility Emssat in December 2003, 
and Aguas Patagonia de Aysen that won a 30-year concession to operate state water utility Emssa in 
January 2003156. 
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The only case of water supply and sanitation operations that had not been privatised and that 
continued to be operated by a municipal enterprise was represented by SMAPA (Empresa de 
Servicios Municipales de Maipu). SMAPA served the city of Maipu, in the Santiago metropolitan 
region, which accounted for 4.4% of Chile‟s total water clients, which boasted the lowest tariffs in the 
country (Ducci, 2007: 129)157. 
 
4.5. Colombia 
Following a number of sectoral reforms, as of 2005, private operators accounted for 13% of all 
Colombian water operations, 5.4% was represented by mixed enterprises and 81.6% by municipal 
operations (Ducci, 2007: 163). At the time of writing and excluding BOT and management contracts 
in Bogota, water MNCs held concessions in Cartagena de las Indias, Barranquilla and other 
neighbouring municipalities, Monteria and Tunja. Municipally-owned PLCs (Public Limited 
Companies or joint stock companies), such as those owned by the municipalities of Medellin, Bogota 
and Manizales, were running their operations commercially and aggressively seeking to expand their 
activities in Colombia and other Latin American countries, specifically Peru.   
 
4.5.1. Agbar’s ACUACAR in Cartagena  
In 1994, a public-private joint venture was set up to provide water supply and sanitation to Cartagena 
de Indias (900,000 inhabitants). Aguas de Barcelona – part of the Suez group - was the only bidder for 
a 45.91% stake (Hall and Lobina, 2007; Hall and Lobina, 2002: 19-20). The 26-year French-style 
affermage-lease contract has been indicated by international and bilateral development agencies as a 
success story, particularly as regards the expansion of services to the poor (Sotomayor, 2003; ARD, 
2005: 61-67; World Bank, 2006). The World Bank (2006) estimates that by 2005 public-private 
operator Aguas de Cartagena (ACUACAR) had extended access to water supply to 99% of the 
population, while access to sewerage reached 95%, respectively from 68% and 56% in 1994 (ARD, 
2005: 63). Also, service quality had improved for existing customers with 24-hour service becoming 
“the norm”, the reduction of Unaccounted-For-Water (UFW) from 60% to 41% and the introduction 
of nearly universal metering. However, the analysis of events suggests that contribution of 
considerable amounts of public finance, the removal of risks for the private partner and the 
assumption of liabilities by local authorities enabled the pursuit of commercial considerations without 
undermining the achievement of performance and social objectives.  
 
The part-privatisation of water services, the first to be adopted in Colombia following legal reform in 
the early 1990s, was decided in reaction to the inefficiency and underinvestment of public operator 
Empresas Públicas Municipales de Cartagena (EPMC) (ARD, 2005: 61-62). Haglund and Gomez 
(2006: 16-17) identify the main causes of EPMC‟s problems as the “appointment of non-qualified 
people in posts that required technical expertise”, the fact that “the water service was used to finance 
other public services, and functioned as a “petty cash drawer” for the municipality” and the artificially 
low tariffs charged which negatively affected EPMC‟s ability to invest. The bidding process was 
hastily organised with very limited time for companies to put forward bids (Haglund and Gomez, 
2006: 18) and the mayor signed the contract with Aguas de Barcelona on his last day in office in 
December 1994. The contract initially provided for the municipal government to hold a 10% equity 
share in the mixed capital operator (ARD, 2005: 62). In 1995 the newly elected mayor of Cartagena 
was fiercely opposed to the lack of transparency and potential corrupt inducements in the 
privatisation, and wanted to annul the contract and remunicipalise the water services, but the World 
Bank made clear that it would make funding conditional to privatisation. As a result, the mayor 
simply renegotiated the terms of the arrangements with Aguas de Barcelona. 158 The city council thus 
came to own 50% while a number of private investors, of whom company employees were a majority, 
owned the remaining 4.09% (Hall and Lobina, 2007).  
 
Contractual design resulted in significant removal of the risks faced by Aguas de Barcelona. Firstly, 
the affermage-lease contract requires ACUACAR, whereby Aguas de Barcelona holds a 45.91% 
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equity stake, to provide a reduced share of investment finance. Secondly, the costs for the operator are 
reduced by ensuring that it has access to the existing and newly built infrastructure free of cost for the 
entire duration of the contract. Furthermore, substantial liabilities have been assumed by the 
municipality as regards payment of pensions to the many former EPMC employees who lost their jobs 
with the award of the contract. Finally, Aguas de Barcelona is generously remunerated in relation to 
the risks assumed and for its performance. 
 
Immediately after being awarded the contract, ACUACAR dismissed all the former 1800 
employees and rehired 270 of them in order to boost operating efficiency (ARD, 2005: 62). 
The municipality retained responsibility for payment of pensions to former EPMC staff that 
had remained unemployed. The consequent financial obligation of 16,000m pesos per year 
($8m) reduces municipal funds available for social investment in health and education…and 
thus creates a negative impact on the urban poor (Lobina and Hall, 2003). This adversely 
affected the municipality‟s finances as its “personnel costs nearly doubled” and the local 
administration had to assume “high levels of debt during that period to cover operational 
deficits” (ARD, 2005: 66-67).     
 
ACUACAR had a responsibility for operating water supply and sanitation, but limited responsibility 
for financing investments. The main investments were financed through a $117.2m project, of which 
$85m was funded by the World Bank, $20m from the central government, $7.6m from Cartagena‟s 
municipal government and just $4.6m from Acuacar itself, though Acuacar is also responsible for 
repaying 10% of the World Bank loan; and a subsequent project of $40.5m, with $24.3m coming from 
the Inter-American Development Bank (Hall and Lobina, 2007). Hall and Lobina (2007) argue that 
ACUACAR‟s claimed achievements in terms of extending water supply and sanitation coverage 
increased from 1995 to 1999, at a growth rate of 5 to 8%, are not remarkable given the scale of 
external investment ($157.7m). Furthermore, as at 1999, the company maintained it had no 
contractual responsibility for people living in unofficial settlements, and as a result many of the poor 
remained „invisible‟ to the contractor: the company claimed that over 90 per cent of the population 
were connected by 1999, whereas a World Bank report the same year stated that “Nearly one-third of 
the population, mostly in poor neighbourhoods, is without running water and basic sanitation 
services”.159 (Hall and Lobina, 2007) 
 
Also, ACUACAR signed a fee-based management with Aguas de Barcelona, so that Aguas de 
Barcelona was remunerated both through dividends and the management fees. This arrangement has 
allowed Aguas de Barcelona to extract increasing revenues from its Cartagena operations, as 
management fees were calculated as a growing percentage of Acuacar's gross income: in the first four 
years of operation, this management fee was fixed at 2.94%, 3.37%, 3.82% and 4.25% respectively of 
gross income: in 1999, when AGUACAR declared profits of $1.96m, AGBAR received $900,000 
from its dividend share and $1,200,000 from its management fee (Lobina and Hall, 2003). The World 
Bank (2006) argues that the fact that the management fee perceived by Aguas de Barcelona is linked 
to revenues “created an incentive to improve billing and collections, as well as to reduce leaks and to 
extend services”. However, it should be noted that the same incentives are expected to derive from the 
payment of dividends to shareholders. Moreover, the increase in number of connections to the system 
is prescribed as an obligation for the operator under the World Bank loan agreement and there are 
contractual provisions for penalties in case of failure to achieve performance targets (World Bank and 
PPIAF, 2006: 205-206).  
 
The extension of services can also be explained in light of highly increased tariff levels, covering all 
operational, financial and investment costs, allowing for cross-subsidies and explicit subsidies in 
favour of low-income consumers (Haglund and Gomez, 2006: 30; World Bank and PPIAF, 2006: 205, 
207; Gómez-Lobo and Contreras, 2003). As regards governance, ARD (2005: 64-65) identify public 
participation via involvement of and supervision by community committees and a citizen watchdog as 
an element contributing to the achievement of the contract‟s objectives. Community organisations 
have also been involved in assisting low-income consumers to pay bills regularly (World Bank and 
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PPIAF, 2006: 44). Other important factors are said to include the appointment of independent experts 
to annually audit ACUACAR‟s activities and the national regulatory framework (ARD, 2005: 64-65).  
 
Other observers have pointed to weaknesses in local democratic control, with the municipality lacking 
technical capacity for negotiation. As put by Nickson (2001), "To all intents and purpose it is a 
sleeping partner"160 (Hall and Lobina, 2007). According to Haglund and Gomez (2006: 19), “After the 
creation of ACUACAR, there was more social awareness about the importance of water and sewage 
services for the city, but accountability has not improved. Despite the fact that ACUACAR provides 
information about outcomes such as coverage, formal mechanisms of control are still weak and have 
been neglected by the company. For the president of the District Council, the institutional design has a 
problem: ACUACAR does the design, the building, and the controlling of quality”.      
 
ARD (2005: 66) express the concern that, as responsibility for extending the network and improving 
the existing system are allocated respectively to the municipality and ACUACAR, the risk of sub-
optimal capital investment will “increase when lending from the international community eventually 
ceases”. Interestingly, in September 2005 Aguas de Barcelona started negotiations with the 
Colombian utility Aguas de Manizales aiming to sell its stake in ACUACAR, explaining that it did 
not see sufficient growth potential in Latin America. The two companies reached an agreement over 
the sale, but the municipality of Cartagena blocked the deal refusing the approval in its quality of 
major ACUACAR shareholder. The mayor explained that the refusal was due to the fact that Aguas 
de Manizales did not have the necessary experience to serve a city of around one million inhabitants. 
In March 2006, Aguas de Barcelona announced that it would continue operating and being a 
shareholder of ACUACAR161. 
 
Finally, an important aspect related to the sustainability of private operations is that of the high cost 
restricting consumers‟ access to the service. Ducci (2007: 164) notes that the reduction in water 
consumption has been considerable, down from over 34 cubic metres per month per person in 1997 to 
some 20 cubic metres per month per person in 2005. Furthermore, in June 2006 40,000 buildings in 
the La Boquilla neighbourhood were not connected yet to the sewerage network. A number of 
families referred to the high connection costs as the impediment to accessing the service and others 
preferred to “keep using septic tanks or they simply don't care about the [sewerage] service”162.  
 
4.5.2. Canal de Isabel II’s Triple A in Barranquilla 
"Public-private water operator Triple A (AAA) has reportedly provided water supply and sanitation 
services to up to 6 million consumers through its combined Colombian and international operations. 
Colombian activities include core operations in Barranquilla and contracts in Soledad, Santa Marta, 
Puerto Colombia and, since March 2005, Sabanagrande and Santo Tomas (Hall and Lobina, 2002: 
20)163. Triple A has also expanded in Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, although it is 
not clear whether the Venezuelan contract is still running (see below section 4.10 Venezuela: 
cancelled concessions accompanied by participatory public operations). In March 2007, it was 
reportedly interested in upgrading Lima‟s water distribution system and getting other contracts in Peru 
(Hall and Lobina, 2002: 21; Ducci, 2007: 164-165)164". 
 
 
In 2002, Madrid‟s municipally-owned water company Canal de Isabel II bought a majority stake in 
INASSA, the company controlling Triple A. This was done through the vehicle Canal Extensia, of 
which Canal de Isabel II owned 75% while the remaining 25% was held by Valencia-based privately-
owned Tecvasa. Madrid municipal government allowed Canal de Isabel II to take out a Euro 58 
million loan to finance the acquisition (Ortega de Miguel and Sanz Mulas, 2007: 145).   
 
In 2004, Triple A‟s management declared that the company was performing well but that the 
Colombian water supply and sanitation sector was not attractive for investors. In 2005, Tecvasa sold 
its equity stake to Canal de Isabel II, which thus controlled 60.4% of Triple A. In 2006, Canal de 
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Isabel II was forced to invest additional equity into INASSA, in order to repay Euro 22 million in 
bonds that had been issued by Triple A (Ortega de Miguel and Sanz Mulas, 2007: 145-146)165.  
 
4.5.3. Veolia and FCC’s Proactiva in Monteria and Tunja 
At the time of writing, Proactiva, a joint subsidiary of Veolia and FCC, served 3.1 million people in 
Colombia through 3 contracts: a BOT wastewater contract in capital city Bogota, a water supply and 
sanitation contract in Monteria and a water supply and sanitation contract in Tunja.  
 
In November 1999, Proactiva won a 20-year water supply and sanitation concession in Monteria166. 
According to Veolia, the number of people served with water supply in Monteria was 329,000 while 
those connected to the sewerage system were 124,000. An IDB report considers the Monteria contract 
as a positive example of private sector participation (Roda, 2003: 34-35). However, in May 2003 
Proactiva was under investigation for alleged misuse of national and regional funds in Monteria. The 
private operator was also criticised for low investment levels and failing to reach contractual targets in 
the first three years of operations. Although the Monteria contract was a concession, whereby the 
private operator was expected to be responsible for financing all operating expenditure and 
infrastructure investment, the government had invested Peso 13 billion (US$ 4.55 million)167.         
 
Proactiva also held a 30-year water supply and sanitation concession in Tunja, running from 1996 to 
2026. According to Veolia, the number of people served with water supply in Tunja was 151,000 
while those connected to the sewerage system were 148,000. 
 
4.5.4. Bogotá BOT contracts 
In March 1998, a private operator 33.34% owned by Proactiva was awarded a 20-year drinking water 
supply BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) contract. The Tibitoc plant, located in the Bogota suburbs, sold 
206.5 million cubic metres per year and served 2 million people, almost 30% of Bogota‟s population. 
The private operator invested US$ 22 million in three years in rehabilitating the water treatment plant 
and water mains. 
    
In 1994, Suez Degremont‟s subsidiary Bogotana de Aguas y Saneamiento won the 30-year Salitre 
wastewater BOT contract (3-year for construction and 27-year for the operation of the plant) serving 2 
million people in Bogota. In December 2004, the contract was terminated after the city council 
calculated that the project was charging ten times too much, and that it was worth paying US$ 80 
million to buy out the contract (Hall and Lobina, 2006: 45)168. 
 
4.5.5. EAAB and EPM in Bogotá 
According to a World Bank study (Sotomayor, 2003: 1), municipally-owned EAAB (Empresa de 
Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogota) is among the most efficient public utilities in Colombia, 
together with Medellin‟s EPM (Empresas Publicas de Medellin) and Manizales‟ Aguas de Manizales.  
 
Since 2000, EAAB has undergone a programme of “modernisation” aiming at minimising costs and 
maximising efficiency through the subdivision of Bogota in 5 operational areas. Each operational area 
was responsible for the operation and maintenance of the secondary water supply and sanitation 
network and commercial management, including dealing with consumers‟ complaints. In December 
2002, EPM‟s subsidiary EPM Bogotá Aguas won the 5-year management and services contract to 
connect users to the water supply and sanitation network, manage water distribution, metering, billing, 
commercial management and dealing with users‟ complaints in two of the five operating areas in 
central and south-eastern Bogota (areas 3 and 4)169.   
 
More precisely, EPM Bogotá Aguas was composed of Medellin‟s EPM, EPM‟s El Retiro-based 
subsidiary Aguas del Oriente Antioqueño, EPM Bogotá, Emtelco and EPM employees‟ FEPEP170. In 
March 2007, EPM was reportedly interested in upgrading Lima‟s water distribution system171. 
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Management and services contracts had also been awarded to Acea‟s Agua Azul, in consortium with 
local consulting firm Grucon, for Bogota‟s areas 2 and 5 and to Aguas Capital, a consortium made of 
local engineering firms and Brazil's Gas Captial, for area 1172. Rome-based MNC Acea owned 51% 
consortium of Aguazul Bogota and served 2.5 million people in the respective areas. It expected the 
contract to generate an annual turnover of US$ 10 million173.   
 
4.5.6. Aguas de Manizales’ contract in Cesar department 
Aguas de Manizales is the municipally-owned water company of Caldas department‟s capital city 
Manizales. Following the blocked deal to take control of ACUACAR174, in August 2006 Aguas de 
Manizales was to start a 3-year, US$ 5.2 million operating contract to provide water supply and 
sanitation services to 24 communes in the department of Cesar, with the exception of the capital city 
of Valledupar. Furthermore, Aguas de Manizales was planning to expand operations in the department 
of Magdalena175.  
 
4.5.7. Emcali 
Emcali, wholly owned by the municipality of Cali (Colombia‟s second largest city), provides water, 
sewerage, electricity and telecommunications to 3 million people. Since the 1990s, Emcali has been 
under severe financial stress entirely caused by the terms of a power purchase agreement (PPA) with 
private generating company TermoEmcali, which required Emcali to buy electricity even if it did not 
need it or could not afford it.  Privatisation was proposed as the solution, and this has been strongly – 
and successfully – opposed by the trade union, SITRAEMCALI, through strikes, occupations, and an 
international campaign including PSI and affiliates (Hall and Lobina, 2002: 9)176.  
 
At the time of writing, Emcali remained in public hands, although it had been put under 
administration in 2000, in order to restore its financial situation. This meant that public services 
regulator Superservicios effectively managed the enterprise, under a plan to restore its financial 
viability. The rescue plan provided for restructuring Emcali‟s debt, reviewing collective work 
contracts, renegotiating the unsustainable PPA agreement and setting up a social capitalisation fund 
aiming at realising savings of US$ 1.07 billion over 20 years and guarantee repayment of debts. The 
plan was agreed in May 2004 and managed to avoid Emcali‟s liquidation, as this had debts for over 
US$ 500 million.  
 
The agreement was signed by the central and the municipal governments, local creditors, 
Termoemcali, service users and workers. The central government would contribute US$ 373 million 
(Peso 1 trillion) to the social capitalisation fund and would repay debts contracted with the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) so that 
Emcali would use its own resources for investment purposes. Cali municipality would start paying for 
the services received from Emcali and contribute Peso 245 billion in assets and cash for the utility. 
The 3,200 Emcali employees would contribute Peso 56 billion in the form of cuts in vacations, 
pension and health payments, but would have payment of their pensions guaranteed for the following 
20 years. Local creditors agreed to forego 35% of their outstanding debts, equal to some Peso 360 
billion, as did Termoencali. The PPA was renegotiated to reduce monthly payments to US$ 1.5 
million from US$ 4.5 million. Finally, consumers would contribute around Peso 400 million over the 
following 20 years through additional charges. The agreement would ensure the funding of a 5-year, 
Peso 2.8 trillion investment programme focused on upgrading telecommunication technology and 
investments in water infrastructure. 
 
A trade union representative declared that they were not happy with the agreement but had signed 
because the only alternative to that would have been the liquidation of Emcali. However, the union 
remained worried about Emcali‟s future. The agreement also provided for an administrative board of 
creditor representatives to supervise Emcali‟s activities and Emcali‟s board, still to be appointed bythe 
mayor of Cali. It was explained that since the creditors had “invested the money so they can drive the 
company”. While Emcali would be turned into a holding company for the different activities, “the 
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physical structure of the company will remain intact with no intention to spin off any divisions that 
include electricity, water, sewerage and telecommunications”.  
 
In 2004, Emcali posted net profits of Peso 104 million (US$ 44.8 million) as opposed to Peso 470 
billion net losses the previous year. In December 2006, Superservicios announced that Emcali would 
remain under administration for further three years, despite calls from the local government to resume 
municipal control. The regulator explained that, according to projections, it would only be in 2010 the 
company's management indicators would have improved sufficiently to return it under municipal 
control. In January 2007, the Colombian government declared that Emcali would have to select a 
private operator to be competitive in the telecommunication market177. At the time of writing it was 
not clear whether that would imply the privatisation of part-privatisation of the other activities of 
Emcali, including water and electricity.  
 
4.6. Ecuador 
 
4.6.1. Quito: Emaap privatisation cancelled after public campaign 
Quito water system and been the object of an attempt to privatise which has met popular resistance in 
the form of a public campaign, which led to the cancellation of privatisation plans. The municipality 
of Quito had been planning to privatise water supply and sanitation company Emaap since 2003. The 
municipality resorted to consultancy Price Waterhouse to conduct a study on how to privatise part of 
the system, in the Parroquias Orientales District, arguing lack of public funds to make the necessary 
new investments178.  
 
More precisely, the plan provided for the selection of a private operator and the transformation of 
Emaap into a public-private company. Four consortia pre-qualified for the final phase of the bidding 
process. These were the Chilean engineering company Hidrosan (owner of Aguas Chañar and Aguas 
Patagonia), the Argentine private operator Latinaguas, a Colombian consortium including Aguas 
Capital (which held a management and services contract in Bogota) and the UK-based MNC 
Biwater179.  
 
The Coalition for the Defence of Public Water, a national organisation of trade unions and community 
groups supporting the human right to water, including lawyers and ecological groups, community 
groups, women‟s groups and indigenous peoples networks, carried out information and education 
campaign with the support of PSI (Public Services International). The campaign focused on analysing 
the implications of the proposed privatisation deal. The Coalition was able to prove that the financial 
calculations made by Price Waterhouse actually required the Municipality to provide almost USD 20 
million in the first 5 years. On the other hand, the private companies, which would take over the 
concession, would only be required to invest USD 7 million. The Coalition also showed that after the 
6th year of the concession, the private company could expect to make a profit over the next 30 years 
of up to USD 226 million. Further, the company would have exclusive rights to the water sources in 
the Quito region180.   
 
As a result of the Coalition‟s campaign, the bidding process was first suspended in September 2006 
and in March 2007 the mayor of Quito announced publicly that the water privatisation process would 
be definitively cancelled181.  
 
4.6.2. IWL’s Interagua to stay in Guayaquil 
In December 2000, Interagua won a 30-year water supply and sanitation concession in Guayaquil 
starting from April 2002. Interagua is a joint venture between International Water Holdings (IWH) -  
which is owned 50-50 by Bechtel, the USA construction company, and Edison s.p.a., the Italian 
electricity company – and an Ecuadorian company, Equidor, S.A.182 As of 31st March 2007, Edison 
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and Bechtel owned 50% each of IWH, and 45% each of International Water Services (Guayaquil) 
Interagua C. Ltda, up from 26.55% in December 2006. 183.  
 
According to the accounts of Edison s.p.a., in 2006  Interagua had sales revenues of Euros €34million, 
an increase of 9.7% over 2005; an operating profit of Euros €10m., over 29% of the income; but 
invested only Euros €8m.184 The IADB financed the costs of creating the private concessions in the 
first place, lending the Ecuadorian government $40m. from 1997 to “to prepare the transfer of the 
concession to the private sector” and convert the state water company into a regulatory body; from 
2003, IADB loaned Interagua US$50m., and in 2006-07 a further US$28 million 185 Interagua also 
raised US$10 million from local investors by issuing interest-bearing notes at the end of 2003. 186 
 
Since the inception, the concession had attracted controversy due to conditionality imposed by the 
IDB, IWL‟s anti-labour practices. The World Bank‟s MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency) had issued a US$18 million guarantee to International Water Services (Guayaquil) BV of the 
Netherlands against political risks such as expropriation, civil disturbance and the wrongful call of a 
performance bond (Hall and Lobina, 2002: 20-21).  
 
MIGA has presented Interagua‟s concession as a successful case of private sector participation187. As 
a matter of fact, by mid 2007 the concession was “under fire” and facing “mounting complaints from 
consumers”. Ecuador's consumer rights watchdog Defensoría del Pueblo filed a legal injunction 
against what it claimed were “excessive charges”. In July 2007, Ecapag (Empresa Cantonal de Agua 
Potable y Alcantarillado de Guayaquil), which acted as a regulator, fined Interagua for failing to 
comply with contractual targets for the first five-year period of operations. More precisely, Interagua 
had failed to realise 8,243 of the 55,238 connections provided for by the contractual agreement. Local 
authorities declared that despite the problems experienced the concession would continue for the 
remaining 25 years, but under tighter scrutiny. To that effect, in August 2007 Guayaquil municipality 
was to assume the control of Ecapag from the central government and carry out regulatory 
functions
188
.   
 
It was not clear whether local authorities had decided to carry on with the concession due to the 
prospect of having to pay compensation in case of termination, as a result of MIGA‟s coverage.  
 
 
4.6.3. Triple A’s Amagua in Samborondon  
In September 2000, Triple A in joint venture with Canal de Isabel II took over privatised water 
company Amagua in Samborondón. Amagua had been created as a public-private joint venture 
between the municipality and a Triple A subsidiary (Hall and Lobina, 2002: 21). As at June 2006, 
Amagua was still part of the Triple A group and continued to operate in Samborondón189. 
 
4.7. Paraguay’s Essap under renewed pressures to privatise before entering WOP with 
Brazilian COPASA  
Paraguay‟s state-owned water company Essap, previously known as Corposana, has recently been 
under renewed pressure to privatise by opening up its capital to private investors and outsourcing 
services. In June 2002, the Paraguay parliament voted to indefinitely suspend the privatisation plans 
for Corposana, which had been driven by fiscal considerations and IMF (International Monetary 
Fund) conditionality. The proposals were for the subdivision of Corposana into up to seven 
concession areas and the award of operating licenses in the different zones. The high level of 
redundancy compensation payments to public employees had represented a major obstacle to the 
implementation of the proposals (Hall and Lobina, 2002: 21).     
 
In January 2006, the Paraguayan government presented to the IMF plans to include private capital in 
Essap as “a step forward to consolidate a better country image in the eyes of multinational entities”. 
Some of Essap‟s services would be contracted out to third parties. In December 2006, the central 
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government established a regulatory council with responsibility over a number of public enterprises 
including Essap. The regulator would be in charge of promoting efficiency “by redefining 
management schemes” and “incorporating reforms and regulations”. The government did not rule out 
privatising or awarding concessions for the operations of any of the public undertakings. “One of the 
priorities of the council will be to define the exact losses of the country's national sanitation service 
utility Essap … Once numbers are clear, authorities will work towards reducing financial losses and 
improving service quality while maintaining competitive prices. Regulating the public entities will 
also serve to determine, in the near future, which would most benefit from either improving public 
management or developing it through privatization or public-private partnership schemes”. The 
central government had previously a study carried out by a consultancy firm which “recommended 
reforms to improve services, quality and profitability, and to establish fair prices”190. 
 
In September 2007, the Paraguayan state water utility Essap signed an agreement with Brazilian 
operator COPASA for the provision of technical assistance on a not-for-profit basis under the UN 
Water Operator Partnership initiative (see above section on Minas Gerais Copasa semi-privatised). 
COPASA would provide technical assistance aimed at helping Essap reduce water leakage in 
Paraguayan capital Asunción and its metropolitan area to increase Essap‟s water provision capacity191. 
Interestingly, in January 2006 Essap‟s five trade unions had requested congressional intervention in 
the company to resolve water shortages in capital Asunción. The trade unions declared “We requested 
the national congress to intervene in the company to investigate irregularities in the shortage of water 
and in certain cases the distribution of water, as well as to look into the managerial deficiencies and 
lack of foresight”192. 
 
4.8. Peru 
In December 2005, the IDB approved a US$ 50 million loan to Peru in order to promote public-
private partnerships (PPPs) in water supply and sanitation. The project‟s total costs amounted to US$ 
90.3 million, of which the Peruvian government would contribute US$ 18 million and German 
development bank KFW US$22.3million. Reception of the funds by the municipalities were 
effectively conditional upon the involvement of private sector operators. The first planned 
privatisations were those of Tumbes and Piura-Paita, while feasibility studies were also being carried 
out for possible projects in Huancayo, Pucallpa and Trujillo, and other municipalities had expressed 
interest in the program 193. 
 
4.8.1. Lima’s Sedapal not to be privatised, yet 
Sedapal is the state-owned water supply and sanitation operator serving Peru‟s capital city Lima and 
Callao. Unaccounted-for Water in the northern part of Lima reaches 58%, as pipes are from 50 to 70 
years old. There have been requests for Sedapal to be privatised or handed over to a private 
concessionaire, specifically and unusually by vocal neighbourhood association “Peruanos sin Agua” 
(Peruvians without Water). Pressure group “Peruanos sin Agua” have organised a campaign and in 
April 2005 staged a 3,000-strong rally calling for Sedapal‟s privatisation, claiming that the utility had 
neglected low income peri-urban residents as it is too slow at extending service coverage. The same 
day, another rally counting 1,000 shanty town dwellers protested against the proposed privatisation of 
Sedapal claiming that the company had become efficient with profits of some US$ 30 million in 2004. 
The CATO Institute have echoed the demands of “Peruanos sin Agua”194. 
 
In March 2007, Peruvian Minister for Housing, Construction and Sanitation Hernán Garrido-Lecca 
declared that the government refused to “offer capital Lima's water utility Sedapal under concession 
because a private company would have to quadruple water rates in order to turn a profit”. In August 
2007, Sedapal turned out the public enterprise that had invested more in the first six months of the 
year. Sedapal had invested over Sol 138 million to extend water supply and sewerage networks in 
Lima and Callao195. 
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In November 2006, Brazilian Sabesp and SEDAPAL were planning to set up a joint venture to 
provide water supply to seven districts located in Lima's southern area (see above section on Sao 
Paulo’s Sabesp semi-privatisation)196. Also, in August 2007 Colombian companies Triple A and 
Medellin‟s EPM were “interested in investing in the upgrading of Sedapal's water distribution 
systems”, as stated by Minister Garrido-Lecca197.         
 
4.8.2. Rio Chillon bulk water concession 
In January 2000, a consortium of Rome‟s ACEA, Italian construction company Impregilo and Peru's 
largest construction company Cosapi won a 27-year concession to provide bulk water supply to the 
northern region of Lima, Peru, with a population of 750,000. Bulk water is supplied on a take-or-pay 
basis to Sedapal. Concessionaire Agua Azul financed their 2-year US$ 35 million investment 
programme by raising US$ 10 million equity, and selling a US$ 25 million bond issue, to local 
investors including pension funds. This was highly rated because the state water company Sedepal has 
signed a take-or-pay agreement, which is further guaranteed by the government, and the price is 
indexed to the US dollar (Hall and Lobina, 2002: 21).  
 
Despite the indexation to the US dollar, the Rio Chillon operations have appeared to be exposed to 
fluctuations due to currency volatility, but also high financial costs. In 2004, Agua Azul posted net 
profits of Sol 12.2 million (US$ 3.74 million), which represented a 50% increase in respect of 2003. 
“Exchange rate gains from a stronger sol helped boost the bottom line, while sales revenue fell 3.96% 
to 36.3mn soles and operating profit dipped 6.1% to 19.1mn soles”. By contrast, in 2005 recorded net 
profits were at Sol 2.85 million (US$ 855,000), or 76.7% less than the previous year. “In 2005, net sales 
dipped 0.42% to 36.1mn soles and operating profit fell 3.35% to 18.5mn soles. Exchange rate losses 
and continued high financial costs impacted the bottom line”198  
 
4.8.3. Problems with Latinaguas’ Tumbes concession despite German and Peruvian public 
subsidies 
Despite an injunction filed by workers to stop the privatisation, in July 2005 a 30-year concession to 
operate water supply and sanitation utility Empafa serving 180,000 urban customers in the department 
of Tumbes, was awarded to Aguas de Tumbes, an Argentinean-Peruvian consortium Latinaguas-
Concisa. The Latinaguas consortium offered US$ 31 million in investments. Other pre-qualified 
groups included: Consorcio Concesionario de Aguas de Tumbes, a consortium of Colombian firm 
Conalvias, Cuban company Tecnicas Hidraulicas and Medellin‟s EPM); Chilean engineering 
company Hidrosan Ingenieria; Veolia and FCC‟s joint subsidiary Proactiva; and, Colombia's 
Conhydra-Hidropacifico-Gecolsa199.  
 
This was the first water concession to be awarded in Peru‟s history, and received international and 
national subsidies. Investments were projected at US$ 62 million, of which German development 
bank KFW would provide Euro 17.5 million (US$ 21.9 million) and the Peruvian government would 
contribute Euro 4million for initial works. More precisely, “The government is to secure over the first 
five years the income to the concessionaire, to be paid Euro$1,350mil over the first stage of the 
concession contract. To support the privatization KFW is to donate US$15mil and lend other 
US$15mil upon the condition the resources would be managed by a third private operator”200. 
 
Despite such a generous support, Peruvian regulator Sunass reportedly found that in the first year of 
operations Aguas de Tumbes had failed to extend water supply and sanitation networks and only 
achieved 5% of the contractually established operational targets201. 
 
4.8.4. Piura-Paita concession 
In October 2006, Peruvian authorities postponed a 30-year water concession in Piura-Paita to 2007. 
Pre-qualified bidders were the following consortia: the Argentine-Peruvian consortium Latinaguas-
Concyssa; a consortium of Colombia's Conalvias and Cuban firm Técnica Hidráulica); the Veolia and 
FCC‟s joint subsidiary Proactiva; and, the Colombian consortium Conhydra-Odinsa202. 
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Projected investments, which were to benefit at least 450,000 people, amounted to US$ 130 million, 
of which the Peruvian government would contribute US$ 20 million to US$ 25 million and US$ 70 
million would be financed by a loan from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation203.   
 
4.8.5. Huancayo concession cancelled and Water Operator Partnership approved instead 
In November 2005, Peruvian authorities were preparing to award a concession in Huncayo along the 
same lines as the Tumbes and Piura-Paita concessions204. However, trade unions in Huancayo and in 
the Buenos Aires province have promoted a Water Operator Partnership between the respective 
enterprises, Sedam Huancayo and ABSA (“5 de setiembre”-operated Aguas Bonaerenses). The 
partnership is for the mutual technical collaboration and assistance between the two public companies. 
An initial study was carried out to assess the extent of needs and to determine compatibilities, 
following which contracts have been negotiated and signed. At the time of writing, the partnership 
was operational. The Water Operator Partnership was accompanied by a parallel agreement entered 
into by trade unions FENTAP and SOSBA under the auspices of PSI. The agreement also provided 
for the involvement of NGOs Transnational Institute (TNI) and Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) 
to support the process by contributing their expertise “experience in the field of organising and 
international solidarity”. The planned concession has thus been cancelled205. 
 
4.8.6. Improved service coverage under public water company Sedacaj 
Sedacaj is a municipally-owned, corporatised water company established as a PLC (Public Limited 
Company or joint stock company). It operates in the area of Cajamarca and its shares are entirely 
owned by the municipal governments of Cajamarca, Contumazá and San Miguel. Observers have 
indicated Sedacaj as a positive example of public water operations as, by 2003, it had achieved to 
expand water services from 71% to 93%206. 
 
4.9. Uruguay: referendum and constitutional reform followed by termination of private 
concessions 
On Sunday 31st October 2004, in Uruguay, a referendum proposing a constitutional amendment on 
water was approved by 62.75% of voters. The amendment includes a number of elements, including 
the statement that access to piped water and sanitation are fundamental human rights, and that social 
considerations take priority over economic considerations in water policies. It also includes the 
statement that: 
 
“The public service of sewerage and the public service of water supplying for the human 
consumption, will be served exclusively and directly by state legal persons”  
 
(“El servicio público de saneamiento y el servicio público de abastecimiento de agua para el 
consumo humano serán prestados exclusiva y directamente por personas jurídicas estatales.”  
See Annexe for Spanish and English text of constitutional amendment.) 
4.9.1. History 
The referendum was promoted by the National Commission for the Defence of Water and Life, which 
included FFOSE - the trade union representing workers in the publicly owned water and sewerage 
company Obras Sanitarias del Estado (OSE) - and several civil society organisations, including 
REDES-Amigos de la Tierra (Friends of the Earth).  Water supply has been privatised through 
concession contracts in two places in Uruguay, and the campaign was based on dissatisfaction with 
the performance and behaviour of these concessions, the pressure for new privatisations from IMF 
loan conditionalities, and further threats arising from trade liberalisation negotiations in the WTO, the 
FTAA, the EU-Mercosur and other free trade and investment agreements. The campaign was also 
based on concern for the environment, including the exploitation of water resources, and on concern 
for the untransparent management of the public utility (whose directors were themselves in favour of 
privatisation). 207 
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4.9.2. Implementation and effect 
The next step under Uruguayan law is that the parliament is now obliged to draft legislation outlining 
the mechanisms for implementing the constitutional reform.  Presidential and parliamentary elections 
were also held on the same day in Uruguay, with a victory in the presidential election for Tabaré 
Vázquez, the candidate of the left-wing EP-FA (Broad Front - a popular front, in political terms) 
coalition, which was one of the supporters of the constitutional reform: the Broad Front also won an 
absolute majority in both houses.  There is some disagreement on the effect on existing concessions, 
but the amendment states that the compensation which may be payable will only cover past 
investments which have not been fully recovered, not compensation for lost future earnings (Hall et 
al., 2004: 2-3). 208 
 
4.9.3. Terminated concessions: Agbar’s Aguas de la Costa and Aguas de Bilbao’s Uragua 
According to Ducci (2007: 145), the constitucional reform led the Uruguayan government to 
negotiate, not without difficulty, the exit of the multinational operators from the country. This 
happened in October 2005 in the case of Aguas de Bilbao, which held the Uragua concession, and in 
September 2006 in the case of Agbar‟s Aguas de la Costa.    
 
However, it should be noted that both concessions had attracted a considerable amount of controversy 
prior to the referendum to outlaw water privatisation. For more details, see Hall and Lobina (2002: 
21-22). 
 
In May 2007, the Andean Development Corporation (Corporacion Andina de Fomento) 
acknowledged that “Uruguay's state-owned water utility (OSE) has proven to be financially 
sustainable”209.  
 
4.10. Venezuela: cancelled concessions accompanied by participatory public operations  
In April 1999, a 4-year management contract for the management of national holding company 
Hidroven‟s subsidiary Hidrolara, in the state of Lara, was awarded to Spanish company Aguas de 
Valencia. Improvements to the service were below expectations and the contract was terminated by 
amiable agreement in December 2002, three months before its expiry (Ducci, 2007: 152-154). 
 
Another 4-year management contract in the state of Monagas was awarded in March 1997 to FCC‟s 
Aguas de Monagas. The contract, which covered 620,000 inhabitants, was not renewed at its expiry in 
March 2001 due to the governmental authorities‟ dissatisfaction with the results and the change in the 
country‟s political climate. State water company Hidroven‟s president declared that public operations 
were problematic and that rehabilitation was being planned (Ducci, 2007: 154-157).        
 
A 30-month contract for the management of Hidrolago in the state of Zulia, covering 3.5 million 
inhabitants, was awarded in August 2001 to Triple A (Hall and Lobina: 22). It is not clear whether 
operations have continued after May 2003210. 
 
According to Veolia, Proactiva has a contract for the network maintenance and management and 
commercial administration in central Caracas, from 2002 to 2008. The operations employ 96 workers. 
 
Public participation under the public operation of Hidrocapital, involving CBOs in metropolitan 
Caracas and peri-urban areas, has been described by a DFID-funded study as an example of building 
responsible citizenship. The reforms have, according to the authors, “helped improve coverage of 
WSS services and strengthened community solidarity ties, while providing examples of participatory 
democracy where not only rights, but also duties of community members are stressed. They have 
arguably helped reduce the impact of patronage politics which has been historically facilitated by the 
high revenues of the oil-rich Venezuelan state to which local and national politicians have had access 
as means of providing infrastructure in exchange for votes” (Allen et al., 2006: 35, 56-57, 59, 77-78, 
88).    
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